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Capabilities(7)		Miscellaneous Information Manual	Capabilities(7)

NAME
       capabilities - overview of Linux capabilities

DESCRIPTION
       For the purpose of performing permission checks, traditional UNIX imple-
       mentations distinguish two categories of processes: privileged processes
       (whose  effective  user	ID is 0, referred to as superuser or root), and
       unprivileged processes (whose effective	UID  is	 nonzero).   Privileged
       processes  bypass  all  kernel  permission  checks,  while  unprivileged
       processes are subject to full permission checking based on the process's
       credentials (usually: effective UID, effective  GID,  and  supplementary
       group list).

       Starting	 with Linux 2.2, Linux divides the privileges traditionally as-
       sociated with superuser into  distinct  units,  known  as  capabilities,
       which  can  be  independently  enabled and disabled.  Capabilities are a
       per-thread attribute.

   Capabilities list
       The following list shows the capabilities implemented on Linux, and  the
       operations or behaviors that each capability permits:

       CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL (since Linux 2.6.11)
	      Enable and disable kernel auditing; change auditing filter rules;
	      retrieve auditing status and filtering rules.

       CAP_AUDIT_READ (since Linux 3.16)
	      Allow reading the audit log via a multicast netlink socket.

       CAP_AUDIT_WRITE (since Linux 2.6.11)
	      Write records to kernel auditing log.

       CAP_BLOCK_SUSPEND (since Linux 3.5)
	      Employ  features	that  can block system suspend (epoll(7) EPOLL-
	      WAKEUP, /proc/sys/wake_lock).

       CAP_BPF (since Linux 5.8)
	      Employ privileged BPF operations; see bpf(2) and bpf-helpers(7).

	      This capability was added in Linux 5.8 to separate out BPF  func-
	      tionality from the overloaded CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability.

       CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE (since Linux 5.9)
	      o	 Update /proc/sys/kernel/ns_last_pid (see pid_namespaces(7));
	      o	 employ the set_tid feature of clone3(2);
	      o	 read the contents of the symbolic links in /proc/pid/map_files
		 for other processes.

	      This  capability	was  added  in Linux 5.9 to separate out check-
	      point/restore functionality from the overloaded CAP_SYS_ADMIN ca-
	      pability.

       CAP_CHOWN
	      Make arbitrary changes to file UIDs and GIDs (see chown(2)).

       CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
	      Bypass file read, write, and execute permission checks.  (DAC  is
	      an abbreviation of "discretionary access control".)

       CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH
	      o	 Bypass file read permission checks and directory read and exe-
		 cute permission checks;
	      o	 invoke open_by_handle_at(2);
	      o	 use  the  linkat(2)  AT_EMPTY_PATH  flag to create a link to a
		 file referred to by a file descriptor.

       CAP_FOWNER
	      o	 Bypass permission checks on operations that  normally	require
		 the filesystem UID of the process to match the UID of the file
		 (e.g., chmod(2), utime(2)), excluding those operations covered
		 by CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE and CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH;
	      o	 set  inode  flags  (see  FS_IOC_SETFLAGS(2const)) on arbitrary
		 files;
	      o	 set Access Control Lists (ACLs) on arbitrary files;
	      o	 ignore directory sticky bit on file deletion;
	      o	 modify user extended attributes on sticky directory  owned  by
		 any user;
	      o	 specify O_NOATIME for arbitrary files in open(2) and fcntl(2).

       CAP_FSETID
	      o	 Don't clear set-user-ID and set-group-ID mode bits when a file
		 is modified;
	      o	 set  the  set-group-ID bit for a file whose GID does not match
		 the filesystem or any of the supplementary GIDs of the calling
		 process.

       CAP_IPC_LOCK
	      o	 Lock memory (mlock(2), mlockall(2), mmap(2), shmctl(2));
	      o	 Allocate memory using huge  pages  (memfd_create(2),  mmap(2),
		 shmctl(2)).

       CAP_IPC_OWNER
	      Bypass permission checks for operations on System V IPC objects.

       CAP_KILL
	      Bypass permission checks for sending signals (see kill(2)).  This
	      includes use of the ioctl(2) KDSIGACCEPT operation.

       CAP_LEASE (since Linux 2.4)
	      Establish leases on arbitrary files (see fcntl(2)).

       CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE
	      Set   the	 FS_APPEND_FL  and  FS_IMMUTABLE_FL  inode  flags  (see
	      FS_IOC_SETFLAGS(2const)).

       CAP_MAC_ADMIN (since Linux 2.6.25)
	      Allow MAC configuration or state changes.	  Implemented  for  the
	      Smack Linux Security Module (LSM).

       CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE (since Linux 2.6.25)
	      Override	Mandatory  Access  Control  (MAC).  Implemented for the
	      Smack LSM.

       CAP_MKNOD (since Linux 2.4)
	      Create special files using mknod(2).

       CAP_NET_ADMIN
	      Perform various network-related operations:
	      o	 interface configuration;
	      o	 administration of IP firewall, masquerading, and accounting;
	      o	 modify routing tables;
	      o	 bind to any address for transparent proxying;
	      o	 set type-of-service (TOS);
	      o	 clear driver statistics;
	      o	 set promiscuous mode;
	      o	 enabling multicasting;
	      o	 use setsockopt(2) to set the following socket options:	 SO_DE-
		 BUG,  SO_MARK, SO_PRIORITY (for a priority outside the range 0
		 to 6), SO_RCVBUFFORCE, and SO_SNDBUFFORCE.

       CAP_NET_BIND_SERVICE
	      Bind a socket to Internet domain privileged ports	 (port	numbers
	      less than 1024).

       CAP_NET_BROADCAST
	      (Unused)	Make socket broadcasts, and listen to multicasts.

       CAP_NET_RAW
	      o	 Use RAW and PACKET sockets;
	      o	 bind to any address for transparent proxying.

       CAP_PERFMON (since Linux 5.8)
	      Employ various performance-monitoring mechanisms, including:

	      o	 call perf_event_open(2);
	      o	 employ	 various  BPF operations that have performance implica-
		 tions.

	      This capability was added in Linux 5.8 to	 separate  out	perfor-
	      mance  monitoring functionality from the overloaded CAP_SYS_ADMIN
	      capability.  See also the kernel	source	file  Documentation/ad-
	      min-guide/perf-security.rst.

       CAP_SETGID
	      o	 Make arbitrary manipulations of process GIDs and supplementary
		 GID list;
	      o	 forge	GID  when  passing  socket  credentials via UNIX domain
		 sockets;
	      o	 write a group ID mapping in a user namespace  (see  user_name-
		 spaces(7)).

       CAP_SETFCAP (since Linux 2.6.24)
	      Set arbitrary capabilities on a file.

	      Since Linux 5.12, this capability is also needed to map user ID 0
	      in a new user namespace; see user_namespaces(7) for details.

       CAP_SETPCAP
	      If  file	capabilities  are supported (i.e., since Linux 2.6.24):
	      add any capability from the calling thread's bounding set to  its
	      inheritable  set;	 drop  capabilities  from the bounding set (via
	      prctl(2) PR_CAPBSET_DROP); make changes to the securebits flags.

	      If file  capabilities  are  not  supported  (i.e.,  before  Linux
	      2.6.24): grant or remove any capability in the caller's permitted
	      capability  set  to or from any other process.  (This property of
	      CAP_SETPCAP is not available when the  kernel  is	 configured  to
	      support file capabilities, since CAP_SETPCAP has entirely differ-
	      ent semantics for such kernels.)

       CAP_SETUID
	      o	 Make  arbitrary  manipulations of process UIDs (setuid(2), se-
		 treuid(2), setresuid(2), setfsuid(2));
	      o	 forge UID when passing	 socket	 credentials  via  UNIX	 domain
		 sockets;
	      o	 write	a  user	 ID mapping in a user namespace (see user_name-
		 spaces(7)).

       CAP_SYS_ADMIN
	      Note: this capability is overloaded; see Notes to kernel develop-
	      ers below.

	      o	 Perform a range of system administration operations including:
		 quotactl(2), mount(2),	 umount(2),  pivot_root(2),  swapon(2),
		 swapoff(2), sethostname(2), and setdomainname(2);
	      o	 perform  privileged  syslog(2) operations (since Linux 2.6.37,
		 CAP_SYSLOG should be used to permit such operations);
	      o	 perform VM86_REQUEST_IRQ vm86(2) command;
	      o	 access the same checkpoint/restore functionality that is  gov-
		 erned	by CAP_CHECKPOINT_RESTORE (but the latter, weaker capa-
		 bility is preferred for accessing that functionality).
	      o	 perform the same BPF operations as  are  governed  by	CAP_BPF
		 (but  the latter, weaker capability is preferred for accessing
		 that functionality).
	      o	 employ the same performance monitoring mechanisms as are  gov-
		 erned	by  CAP_PERFMON	 (but  the latter, weaker capability is
		 preferred for accessing that functionality).
	      o	 perform IPC_SET and IPC_RMID operations on arbitrary System  V
		 IPC objects;
	      o	 override RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit;
	      o	 perform operations on trusted and security extended attributes
		 (see xattr(7));
	      o	 use lookup_dcookie(2);
	      o	 use  ioprio_set(2) to assign IOPRIO_CLASS_RT and (before Linux
		 2.6.25) IOPRIO_CLASS_IDLE I/O scheduling classes;
	      o	 forge PID when passing	 socket	 credentials  via  UNIX	 domain
		 sockets;
	      o	 exceed	 /proc/sys/fs/file-max,	 the  system-wide  limit on the
		 number of open files, in system calls that open  files	 (e.g.,
		 accept(2), execve(2), open(2), pipe(2));
	      o	 employ	 CLONE_* flags that create new namespaces with clone(2)
		 and unshare(2) (but, since Linux 3.8, creating user namespaces
		 does not require any capability);
	      o	 access privileged perf event information;
	      o	 call setns(2) (requires  CAP_SYS_ADMIN	 in  the  target  name-
		 space);
	      o	 call fanotify_init(2);
	      o	 perform  privileged  KEYCTL_CHOWN and KEYCTL_SETPERM keyctl(2)
		 operations;
	      o	 perform madvise(2) MADV_HWPOISON operation;
	      o	 employ the TIOCSTI ioctl(2) to insert characters into the  in-
		 put  queue  of	 a terminal other than the caller's controlling
		 terminal;
	      o	 employ the obsolete nfsservctl(2) system call;
	      o	 employ the obsolete bdflush(2) system call;
	      o	 perform various privileged block-device ioctl(2) operations;
	      o	 perform various privileged filesystem ioctl(2) operations;
	      o	 perform privileged ioctl(2) operations on the /dev/random  de-
		 vice (see random(4));
	      o	 install  a  seccomp(2)	 filter without first having to set the
		 no_new_privs thread attribute;
	      o	 modify allow/deny rules for device control groups;
	      o	 employ the ptrace(2)  PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER  operation  to
		 dump tracee's seccomp filters;
	      o	 employ	 the  ptrace(2)	 PTRACE_SETOPTIONS operation to suspend
		 the tracee's  seccomp	protections  (i.e.,  the  PTRACE_O_SUS-
		 PEND_SECCOMP flag);
	      o	 perform administrative operations on many device drivers;
	      o	 modify autogroup nice values by writing to /proc/pid/autogroup
		 (see sched(7)).

       CAP_SYS_BOOT
	      Use reboot(2) and kexec_load(2).

       CAP_SYS_CHROOT
	      o	 Use chroot(2);
	      o	 change mount namespaces using setns(2).

       CAP_SYS_MODULE
	      o	 Load	and  unload  kernel  modules  (see  init_module(2)  and
		 delete_module(2));
	      o	 before Linux 2.6.25: drop capabilities	 from  the  system-wide
		 capability bounding set.

       CAP_SYS_NICE
	      o	 Lower	the  process  nice  value (nice(2), setpriority(2)) and
		 change the nice value for arbitrary processes;
	      o	 set real-time scheduling policies for calling process, and set
		 scheduling policies and  priorities  for  arbitrary  processes
		 (sched_setscheduler(2), sched_setparam(2), sched_setattr(2));
	      o	 set  CPU  affinity  for  arbitrary  processes (sched_setaffin-
		 ity(2));
	      o	 set I/O scheduling class and priority for arbitrary  processes
		 (ioprio_set(2));
	      o	 apply	 migrate_pages(2)  to  arbitrary  processes  and  allow
		 processes to be migrated to arbitrary nodes;
	      o	 apply move_pages(2) to arbitrary processes;
	      o	 use the MPOL_MF_MOVE_ALL flag with mbind(2) and move_pages(2).

       CAP_SYS_PACCT
	      Use acct(2).

       CAP_SYS_PTRACE
	      o	 Trace arbitrary processes using ptrace(2);
	      o	 apply get_robust_list(2) to arbitrary processes;
	      o	 transfer data to or from the memory of arbitrary processes us-
		 ing process_vm_readv(2) and process_vm_writev(2);
	      o	 inspect processes using kcmp(2).

       CAP_SYS_RAWIO
	      o	 Perform I/O port operations (iopl(2) and ioperm(2));
	      o	 access /proc/kcore;
	      o	 employ the FIBMAP ioctl(2) operation;
	      o	 open devices for accessing x86 model-specific registers (MSRs,
		 see msr(4));
	      o	 update /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr;
	      o	 create memory mappings at addresses below the value  specified
		 by /proc/sys/vm/mmap_min_addr;
	      o	 map files in /proc/bus/pci;
	      o	 open /dev/mem and /dev/kmem;
	      o	 perform various SCSI device commands;
	      o	 perform certain operations on hpsa(4) and cciss(4) devices;
	      o	 perform  a  range  of	device-specific operations on other de-
		 vices.

       CAP_SYS_RESOURCE
	      o	 Use reserved space on ext2 filesystems;
	      o	 make ioctl(2) calls controlling ext3 journaling;
	      o	 override disk quota limits;
	      o	 increase resource limits (see setrlimit(2));
	      o	 override RLIMIT_NPROC resource limit;
	      o	 override maximum number of consoles on console allocation;
	      o	 override maximum number of keymaps;
	      o	 allow more than 64hz interrupts from the real-time clock;
	      o	 raise msg_qbytes limit for a System V message queue above  the
		 limit in /proc/sys/kernel/msgmnb (see msgop(2) and msgctl(2));
	      o	 allow	the  RLIMIT_NOFILE resource limit on the number of "in-
		 flight" file descriptors to be bypassed when passing file  de-
		 scriptors  to	another	 process  via a UNIX domain socket (see
		 unix(7));
	      o	 override the /proc/sys/fs/pipe-size-max limit when setting the
		 capacity of a pipe using the F_SETPIPE_SZ fcntl(2) command;
	      o	 use F_SETPIPE_SZ to increase the capacity of a pipe above  the
		 limit specified by /proc/sys/fs/pipe-max-size;
	      o	 override			/proc/sys/fs/mqueue/queues_max,
		 /proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg_max,	and    /proc/sys/fs/mqueue/msg-
		 size_max  limits  when	 creating  POSIX  message  queues  (see
		 mq_overview(7));
	      o	 employ the prctl(2) PR_SET_MM operation;
	      o	 set /proc/pid/oom_score_adj to a value lower  than  the  value
		 last set by a process with CAP_SYS_RESOURCE.

       CAP_SYS_TIME
	      Set  system  clock  (settimeofday(2), stime(2), adjtimex(2)); set
	      real-time (hardware) clock.

       CAP_SYS_TTY_CONFIG
	      Use vhangup(2); employ various privileged ioctl(2) operations  on
	      virtual terminals.

       CAP_SYSLOG (since Linux 2.6.37)
	      o	 Perform  privileged  syslog(2)	 operations.  See syslog(2) for
		 information on which operations require privilege.
	      o	 View kernel addresses exposed via /proc and  other  interfaces
		 when /proc/sys/kernel/kptr_restrict has the value 1.  (See the
		 discussion of the kptr_restrict in proc(5).)

       CAP_WAKE_ALARM (since Linux 3.0)
	      Trigger  something  that will wake up the system (set CLOCK_REAL-
	      TIME_ALARM and CLOCK_BOOTTIME_ALARM timers).

   Past and current implementation
       A full implementation of capabilities requires that:

       o  For all privileged operations, the  kernel  must  check  whether  the
	  thread has the required capability in its effective set.

       o  The  kernel  must provide system calls allowing a thread's capability
	  sets to be changed and retrieved.

       o  The filesystem must support attaching capabilities to	 an  executable
	  file, so that a process gains those capabilities when the file is ex-
	  ecuted.

       Before  Linux  2.6.24, only the first two of these requirements are met;
       since Linux 2.6.24, all three requirements are met.

   Notes to kernel developers
       When adding a new kernel feature that should be governed by  a  capabil-
       ity, consider the following points.

       o  The  goal  of	 capabilities  is  divide  the	power of superuser into
	  pieces, such that if a program that has one or more  capabilities  is
	  compromised,	its power to do damage to the system would be less than
	  the same program running with root privilege.

       o  You have the choice of either creating a new capability for your  new
	  feature, or associating the feature with one of the existing capabil-
	  ities.   In  order  to  keep	the set of capabilities to a manageable
	  size, the latter option is preferable, unless	 there	are  compelling
	  reasons to take the former option.  (There is also a technical limit:
	  the size of capability sets is currently limited to 64 bits.)

       o  To  determine which existing capability might best be associated with
	  your new feature, review the list of capabilities above in  order  to
	  find a "silo" into which your new feature best fits.	One approach to
	  take	is to determine if there are other features requiring capabili-
	  ties that will always be used along with the new feature.  If the new
	  feature is useless without these other features, you should  use  the
	  same capability as the other features.

       o  Don't choose CAP_SYS_ADMIN if you can possibly avoid it!  A vast pro-
	  portion  of existing capability checks are associated with this capa-
	  bility (see the partial list above).	It can plausibly be called "the
	  new root", since on the one hand, it confers a wide range of	powers,
	  and  on  the other hand, its broad scope means that this is the capa-
	  bility that is required by many privileged programs.	Don't make  the
	  problem  worse.  The only new features that should be associated with
	  CAP_SYS_ADMIN are ones that closely match existing uses in that silo.

       o  If you have determined that it really is necessary to	 create	 a  new
	  capability  for your feature, don't make or name it as a "single-use"
	  capability.  Thus, for example, the addition of the  highly  specific
	  CAP_SYS_PACCT	 was  probably a mistake.  Instead, try to identify and
	  name your new capability as a broader silo into which	 other	related
	  future use cases might fit.

   Thread capability sets
       Each thread has the following capability sets containing zero or more of
       the above capabilities:

       Permitted
	      This  is	a limiting superset for the effective capabilities that
	      the thread may assume.  It is also a limiting  superset  for  the
	      capabilities that may be added to the inheritable set by a thread
	      that  does  not  have the CAP_SETPCAP capability in its effective
	      set.

	      If a thread drops a capability from its  permitted  set,	it  can
	      never  reacquire	that  capability (unless it execve(2)s either a
	      set-user-ID-root program, or a program whose associated file  ca-
	      pabilities grant that capability).

       Inheritable
	      This is a set of capabilities preserved across an execve(2).  In-
	      heritable capabilities remain inheritable when executing any pro-
	      gram, and inheritable capabilities are added to the permitted set
	      when  executing  a program that has the corresponding bits set in
	      the file inheritable set.

	      Because inheritable  capabilities	 are  not  generally  preserved
	      across  execve(2)	 when  running as a non-root user, applications
	      that wish to  run	 helper	 programs  with	 elevated  capabilities
	      should consider using ambient capabilities, described below.

       Effective
	      This  is	the  set  of capabilities used by the kernel to perform
	      permission checks for the thread.

       Bounding (per-thread since Linux 2.6.25)
	      The capability bounding set is a mechanism that can  be  used  to
	      limit the capabilities that are gained during execve(2).

	      Since  Linux  2.6.25,  this  is  a per-thread capability set.  In
	      older kernels, the capability bounding set was a system wide  at-
	      tribute shared by all threads on the system.

	      For more details, see Capability bounding set below.

       Ambient (since Linux 4.3)
	      This  is	a  set of capabilities that are preserved across an ex-
	      ecve(2) of a program that is not privileged.  The	 ambient  capa-
	      bility set obeys the invariant that no capability can ever be am-
	      bient if it is not both permitted and inheritable.

	      The  ambient  capability	set  can  be  directly	modified  using
	      prctl(2).	 Ambient capabilities are automatically lowered if  ei-
	      ther  of	the corresponding permitted or inheritable capabilities
	      is lowered.

	      Executing a program that changes UID or GID due to the  set-user-
	      ID  or set-group-ID bits or executing a program that has any file
	      capabilities set will clear the ambient set.   Ambient  capabili-
	      ties are added to the permitted set and assigned to the effective
	      set  when	 execve(2)  is called.	If ambient capabilities cause a
	      process's permitted and effective capabilities to increase during
	      an execve(2), this does not trigger the secure-execution mode de-
	      scribed in ld.so(8).

       A child created via fork(2) inherits copies of its  parent's  capability
       sets.   For details on how execve(2) affects capabilities, see Transfor-
       mation of capabilities during execve() below.

       Using capset(2), a thread may manipulate its own	 capability  sets;  see
       Programmatically adjusting capability sets below.

       Since  Linux 3.2, the file /proc/sys/kernel/cap_last_cap exposes the nu-
       merical value of the highest capability supported by the running kernel;
       this can be used to determine the highest bit that may be set in a capa-
       bility set.

   File capabilities
       Since Linux 2.6.24, the kernel supports associating capability sets with
       an executable file using setcap(8).  The file capability sets are stored
       in an extended attribute (see  setxattr(2)  and	xattr(7))  named  secu-
       rity.capability.	  Writing  to  this  extended  attribute  requires  the
       CAP_SETFCAP capability.	The file capability sets, in  conjunction  with
       the  capability	sets  of  the  thread,	determine the capabilities of a
       thread after an execve(2).

       The three file capability sets are:

       Permitted (formerly known as forced):
	      These capabilities are automatically permitted to the thread, re-
	      gardless of the thread's inheritable capabilities.

       Inheritable (formerly known as allowed):
	      This set is ANDed with the thread's inheritable set to  determine
	      which  inheritable  capabilities are enabled in the permitted set
	      of the thread after the execve(2).

       Effective:
	      This is not a set, but rather just a single bit.	If this bit  is
	      set,  then during an execve(2) all of the new permitted capabili-
	      ties for the thread are also raised in  the  effective  set.   If
	      this  bit	 is  not  set, then after an execve(2), none of the new
	      permitted capabilities is in the new effective set.

	      Enabling the file effective capability bit implies that any  file
	      permitted	 or  inheritable capability that causes a thread to ac-
	      quire the corresponding permitted capability during an  execve(2)
	      (see  Transformation  of capabilities during execve() below) will
	      also acquire that capability in its  effective  set.   Therefore,
	      when    assigning	   capabilities	   to	 a   file   (setcap(8),
	      cap_set_file(3), cap_set_fd(3)), if we specify the effective flag
	      as being enabled for any capability, then the effective flag must
	      also be specified as enabled for all other capabilities for which
	      the corresponding permitted or inheritable flag is enabled.

   File capability extended attribute versioning
       To allow extensibility, the kernel supports a scheme to encode a version
       number inside the security.capability extended attribute that is used to
       implement file capabilities.  These version numbers are internal to  the
       implementation, and not directly visible to user-space applications.  To
       date, the following versions are supported:

       VFS_CAP_REVISION_1
	      This  was the original file capability implementation, which sup-
	      ported 32-bit masks for file capabilities.

       VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 (since Linux 2.6.25)
	      This version allows for file capability masks that are 64 bits in
	      size, and was necessary as the number of	supported  capabilities
	      grew  beyond  32.	  The kernel transparently continues to support
	      the execution of files that  have	 32-bit	 version  1  capability
	      masks,  but when adding capabilities to files that did not previ-
	      ously have capabilities, or modifying the capabilities of	 exist-
	      ing  files, it automatically uses the version 2 scheme (or possi-
	      bly the version 3 scheme, as described below).

       VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 (since Linux 4.14)
	      Version 3 file capabilities are provided	to  support  namespaced
	      file capabilities (described below).

	      As  with	version 2 file capabilities, version 3 capability masks
	      are 64 bits in size.  But in addition, the root user ID of  name-
	      space  is	 encoded in the security.capability extended attribute.
	      (A namespace's root user ID is the value that user  ID  0	 inside
	      that namespace maps to in the initial user namespace.)

	      Version  3 file capabilities are designed to coexist with version
	      2 capabilities; that is, on a modern Linux system, there	may  be
	      some  files with version 2 capabilities while others have version
	      3 capabilities.

       Before Linux 4.14, the only kind of file capability  extended  attribute
       that  could  be	attached  to a file was a VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 attribute.
       Since Linux 4.14, the version of the  security.capability  extended  at-
       tribute that is attached to a file depends on the circumstances in which
       the attribute was created.

       Starting	 with  Linux  4.14, a security.capability extended attribute is
       automatically created as (or converted to) a  version  3	 (VFS_CAP_REVI-
       SION_3) attribute if both of the following are true:

       o  The  thread  writing the attribute resides in a noninitial user name-
	  space.  (More precisely: the thread resides in a user namespace other
	  than the one from which the underlying filesystem was mounted.)

       o  The thread has the CAP_SETFCAP capability over the file inode,  mean-
	  ing  that  (a)  the  thread has the CAP_SETFCAP capability in its own
	  user namespace; and (b) the UID and GID of the file inode  have  map-
	  pings in the writer's user namespace.

       When a VFS_CAP_REVISION_3 security.capability extended attribute is cre-
       ated,  the root user ID of the creating thread's user namespace is saved
       in the extended attribute.

       By contrast, creating or modifying a  security.capability  extended  at-
       tribute from a privileged (CAP_SETFCAP) thread that resides in the name-
       space  where  the underlying filesystem was mounted (this normally means
       the initial user namespace) automatically results in the creation  of  a
       version 2 (VFS_CAP_REVISION_2) attribute.

       Note  that  the creation of a version 3 security.capability extended at-
       tribute is automatic.  That is to say,  when  a	user-space  application
       writes  (setxattr(2))  a	 security.capability attribute in the version 2
       format, the kernel will automatically create a version  3  attribute  if
       the  attribute  is created in the circumstances described above.	 Corre-
       spondingly, when a version 3 security.capability attribute is  retrieved
       (getxattr(2)) by a process that resides inside a user namespace that was
       created	by  the	 root user ID (or a descendant of that user namespace),
       the returned attribute is (automatically) simplified to appear as a ver-
       sion 2 attribute (i.e., the returned value is the size of  a  version  2
       attribute  and  does  not  include  the	root user ID).	These automatic
       translations mean that no  changes  are	required  to  user-space  tools
       (e.g.,  setcap(1)  and getcap(1)) in order for those tools to be used to
       create and retrieve version 3 security.capability attributes.

       Note that a file can have either a version 2 or a version 3 security.ca-
       pability extended attribute associated with it, but not	both:  creation
       or modification of the security.capability extended attribute will auto-
       matically modify the version according to the circumstances in which the
       extended attribute is created or modified.

   Transformation of capabilities during execve()
       During  an  execve(2), the kernel calculates the new capabilities of the
       process using the following algorithm:

	   P'(ambient)	   = (file is privileged) ? 0 : P(ambient)

	   P'(permitted)   = (P(inheritable) & F(inheritable)) |
			     (F(permitted) & P(bounding)) | P'(ambient)

	   P'(effective)   = F(effective) ? P'(permitted) : P'(ambient)

	   P'(inheritable) = P(inheritable)    [i.e., unchanged]

	   P'(bounding)	   = P(bounding)       [i.e., unchanged]

       where:

	   P()	  denotes the value of a thread capability set before  the  ex-
		  ecve(2)

	   P'()	  denotes  the	value  of a thread capability set after the ex-
		  ecve(2)

	   F()	  denotes a file capability set

       Note the following details relating to the above capability  transforma-
       tion rules:

       o  The ambient capability set is present only since Linux 4.3.  When de-
	  termining  the  transformation of the ambient set during execve(2), a
	  privileged file is one that has capabilities or has  the  set-user-ID
	  or set-group-ID bit set.

       o  Prior	 to  Linux 2.6.25, the bounding set was a system-wide attribute
	  shared by all threads.  That system-wide value was employed to calcu-
	  late the new permitted set during execve(2) in  the  same  manner  as
	  shown above for P(bounding).

       Note:  during the capability transitions described above, file capabili-
       ties may be ignored (treated as empty) for the  same  reasons  that  the
       set-user-ID  and set-group-ID bits are ignored; see execve(2).  File ca-
       pabilities are similarly ignored if  the	 kernel	 was  booted  with  the
       no_file_caps option.

       Note:  according	 to the rules above, if a process with nonzero user IDs
       performs an execve(2) then any capabilities that are present in its per-
       mitted and effective sets will be cleared.  For the treatment  of  capa-
       bilities	 when  a  process with a user ID of zero performs an execve(2),
       see Capabilities and execution of programs by root below.

   Safety checking for capability-dumb binaries
       A capability-dumb binary is an application that has been marked to  have
       file  capabilities,  but has not been converted to use the libcap(3) API
       to manipulate its capabilities.	(In other words, this is a  traditional
       set-user-ID-root	 program  that	has been switched to use file capabili-
       ties, but whose code has not been modified to understand	 capabilities.)
       For  such applications, the effective capability bit is set on the file,
       so that the file permitted capabilities are automatically enabled in the
       process effective set when executing the file.  The kernel recognizes  a
       file  which  has the effective capability bit set as capability-dumb for
       the purpose of the check described here.

       When executing a	 capability-dumb  binary,  the	kernel	checks	if  the
       process	obtained  all permitted capabilities that were specified in the
       file permitted set, after the capability transformations described above
       have been performed.  (The typical reason why this might	 not  occur  is
       that  the capability bounding set masked out some of the capabilities in
       the file permitted set.)	 If the process did not obtain the full set  of
       file  permitted capabilities, then execve(2) fails with the error EPERM.
       This prevents possible security risks that could arise when  a  capabil-
       ity-dumb	 application  is  executed  with  less privilege than it needs.
       Note that, by definition, the application  could	 not  itself  recognize
       this problem, since it does not employ the libcap(3) API.

   Capabilities and execution of programs by root
       In  order to mirror traditional UNIX semantics, the kernel performs spe-
       cial treatment of file capabilities when a process with UID 0 (root) ex-
       ecutes a program and when a set-user-ID-root program is executed.

       After having performed any changes to the process effective ID that were
       triggered by the set-user-ID mode bit of the binary--e.g., switching the
       effective user ID to 0 (root) because a set-user-ID-root program was ex-
       ecuted--the kernel calculates the file capability sets as follows:

       (1)  If the real or effective user ID of the process is 0  (root),  then
	    the	 file  inheritable and permitted sets are ignored; instead they
	    are notionally considered to be all ones  (i.e.,  all  capabilities
	    enabled).	(There	is one exception to this behavior, described in
	    Set-user-ID-root programs that have file capabilities below.)

       (2)  If the effective user ID of the process is 0 (root) or the file ef-
	    fective bit is in fact enabled, then the file effective bit is  no-
	    tionally defined to be one (enabled).

       These  notional	values	for the file's capability sets are then used as
       described above to calculate the transformation of the  process's  capa-
       bilities during execve(2).

       Thus,  when  a  process	with nonzero UIDs execve(2)s a set-user-ID-root
       program that does not have capabilities	attached,  or  when  a	process
       whose  real and effective UIDs are zero execve(2)s a program, the calcu-
       lation of the process's new permitted capabilities simplifies to:

	   P'(permitted)   = P(inheritable) | P(bounding)

	   P'(effective)   = P'(permitted)

       Consequently, the process gains all capabilities in  its	 permitted  and
       effective  capability  sets,  except  those masked out by the capability
       bounding set.  (In the calculation  of  P'(permitted),  the  P'(ambient)
       term  can be simplified away because it is by definition a proper subset
       of P(inheritable).)

       The special treatments of user ID 0 (root) described in this  subsection
       can be disabled using the securebits mechanism described below.

   Set-user-ID-root programs that have file capabilities
       There is one exception to the behavior described in Capabilities and ex-
       ecution of programs by root above.  If (a) the binary that is being exe-
       cuted  has capabilities attached and (b) the real user ID of the process
       is not 0 (root) and (c) the effective  user  ID	of  the	 process  is  0
       (root),	then  the  file capability bits are honored (i.e., they are not
       notionally considered to be all ones).  The usual way in which this sit-
       uation can arise is when executing a set-UID-root program that also  has
       file  capabilities.   When such a program is executed, the process gains
       just the capabilities granted by the program (i.e.,  not	 all  capabili-
       ties, as would occur when executing a set-user-ID-root program that does
       not have any associated file capabilities).

       Note  that  one	can assign empty capability sets to a program file, and
       thus it is possible to create a set-user-ID-root	 program  that	changes
       the  effective  and  saved  set-user-ID of the process that executes the
       program to 0, but confers no capabilities to that process.

   Capability bounding set
       The capability bounding set is a security mechanism that can be used  to
       limit  the  capabilities	 that  can  be gained during an execve(2).  The
       bounding set is used in the following ways:

       o  During an execve(2), the capability bounding set is  ANDed  with  the
	  file	permitted  capability  set, and the result of this operation is
	  assigned to the thread's permitted capability	 set.	The  capability
	  bounding  set	 thus places a limit on the permitted capabilities that
	  may be granted by an executable file.

       o  (Since Linux 2.6.25) The capability bounding set acts as  a  limiting
	  superset  for the capabilities that a thread can add to its inherita-
	  ble set using capset(2).  This means that if a capability is	not  in
	  the  bounding set, then a thread can't add this capability to its in-
	  heritable set, even if it was	 in  its  permitted  capabilities,  and
	  thereby  cannot  have	 this capability preserved in its permitted set
	  when it execve(2)s a file that has the capability in its  inheritable
	  set.

       Note  that  the	bounding set masks the file permitted capabilities, but
       not the inheritable capabilities.  If a thread maintains a capability in
       its inheritable set that is not in its bounding set, then it  can  still
       gain  that  capability in its permitted set by executing a file that has
       the capability in its inheritable set.

       Depending on the kernel version, the capability bounding set is either a
       system-wide attribute, or a per-process attribute.

       Capability bounding set from Linux 2.6.25 onward

       From Linux 2.6.25, the capability  bounding  set	 is  a	per-thread  at-
       tribute.	  (The	system-wide  capability bounding set described below no
       longer exists.)

       The bounding set is inherited at fork(2) from the thread's  parent,  and
       is preserved across an execve(2).

       A  thread may remove capabilities from its capability bounding set using
       the prctl(2) PR_CAPBSET_DROP operation, provided it has the  CAP_SETPCAP
       capability.   Once  a capability has been dropped from the bounding set,
       it cannot be restored to that set.  A thread can determine if a capabil-
       ity is in its bounding set using the prctl(2) PR_CAPBSET_READ operation.

       Removing capabilities from the bounding set is supported	 only  if  file
       capabilities  are  compiled  into the kernel.  Before Linux 2.6.33, file
       capabilities were an optional feature configurable via the  CONFIG_SECU-
       RITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES  option.	 Since	Linux 2.6.33, the configuration
       option has been removed and file capabilities are  always  part	of  the
       kernel.	 When  file capabilities are compiled into the kernel, the init
       process (the ancestor of all processes) begins with a full bounding set.
       If file capabilities are not compiled into the kernel, then init	 begins
       with  a full bounding set minus CAP_SETPCAP, because this capability has
       a different meaning when there are no file capabilities.

       Removing a capability from the bounding set does not remove it from  the
       thread's	 inheritable  set.  However it does prevent the capability from
       being added back into the thread's inheritable set in the future.

       Capability bounding set prior to Linux 2.6.25

       Before Linux 2.6.25, the capability bounding set is  a  system-wide  at-
       tribute that affects all threads on the system.	The bounding set is ac-
       cessible	 via  the  file /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound.  (Confusingly, this
       bit  mask  parameter  is	 expressed  as	a  signed  decimal  number   in
       /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound.)

       Only  the  init	process may set capabilities in the capability bounding
       set; other than that, the superuser (more precisely: a process with  the
       CAP_SYS_MODULE capability) may only clear capabilities from this set.

       On  a  standard	system the capability bounding set always masks out the
       CAP_SETPCAP capability.	To remove this restriction (dangerous!), modify
       the definition of CAP_INIT_EFF_SET in include/linux/capability.h and re-
       build the kernel.

       The system-wide capability bounding  set	 feature  was  added  to  Linux
       2.2.11.

   Effect of user ID changes on capabilities
       To  preserve  the  traditional  semantics  for transitions between 0 and
       nonzero user IDs, the kernel makes the following changes to  a  thread's
       capability  sets	 on changes to the thread's real, effective, saved set,
       and filesystem user IDs (using setuid(2), setresuid(2), or similar):

       o  If one or more of the real, effective, or saved set user IDs was pre-
	  viously 0, and as a result of the UID changes all of these IDs have a
	  nonzero value, then all capabilities are cleared from the  permitted,
	  effective, and ambient capability sets.

       o  If the effective user ID is changed from 0 to nonzero, then all capa-
	  bilities are cleared from the effective set.

       o  If  the effective user ID is changed from nonzero to 0, then the per-
	  mitted set is copied to the effective set.

       o  If the filesystem user ID is changed from 0  to  nonzero  (see  setf-
	  suid(2)), then the following capabilities are cleared from the effec-
	  tive	  set:	  CAP_CHOWN,   CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE,   CAP_DAC_READ_SEARCH,
	  CAP_FOWNER, CAP_FSETID,  CAP_LINUX_IMMUTABLE	(since	Linux  2.6.30),
	  CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE,   and  CAP_MKNOD  (since  Linux  2.6.30).	If  the
	  filesystem UID is changed from nonzero to 0, then any of these  capa-
	  bilities that are enabled in the permitted set are enabled in the ef-
	  fective set.

       If  a thread that has a 0 value for one or more of its user IDs wants to
       prevent its permitted capability set being cleared when it resets all of
       its user IDs to nonzero values, it can do so using the  SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS
       securebits flag described below.

   Programmatically adjusting capability sets
       A thread can retrieve and change its permitted, effective, and inherita-
       ble  capability	sets  using  the  capget(2) and capset(2) system calls.
       However, the use of cap_get_proc(3) and cap_set_proc(3),	 both  provided
       in  the	libcap	package,  is preferred for this purpose.  The following
       rules govern changes to the thread capability sets:

       o  If the caller does not have the CAP_SETPCAP capability, the  new  in-
	  heritable set must be a subset of the combination of the existing in-
	  heritable and permitted sets.

       o  (Since  Linux 2.6.25) The new inheritable set must be a subset of the
	  combination of the existing inheritable set and the capability bound-
	  ing set.

       o  The new permitted set must be a subset of the existing permitted  set
	  (i.e.,  it is not possible to acquire permitted capabilities that the
	  thread does not currently have).

       o  The new effective set must be a subset of the new permitted set.

   The securebits flags: establishing a capabilities-only environment
       Starting with Linux 2.6.26, and with a kernel in which file capabilities
       are enabled, Linux implements a set of per-thread securebits flags  that
       can  be	used  to  disable  special  handling  of capabilities for UID 0
       (root).	These flags are as follows:

       SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS
	      Setting this flag allows a thread that has one or more 0 UIDs  to
	      retain  capabilities in its permitted set when it switches all of
	      its UIDs to nonzero values.  If this flag is not set, then such a
	      UID switch causes the thread to lose all permitted  capabilities.
	      This flag is always cleared on an execve(2).

	      Note  that even with the SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS flag set, the effective
	      capabilities of a thread are cleared when it switches its	 effec-
	      tive UID to a nonzero value.  However, if the thread has set this
	      flag  and	 its  effective	 UID is already nonzero, and the thread
	      subsequently switches all other UIDs to nonzero values, then  the
	      effective capabilities will not be cleared.

	      The  setting  of	the  SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS  flag  is	 ignored if the
	      SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP flag is set.  (The latter flag provides  a
	      superset of the effect of the former flag.)

	      This  flag  provides the same functionality as the older prctl(2)
	      PR_SET_KEEPCAPS operation.

       SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP
	      Setting this flag stops the kernel from adjusting	 the  process's
	      permitted,  effective,  and  ambient  capability	sets  when  the
	      thread's effective and filesystem UIDs are switched between  zero
	      and  nonzero  values.  See Effect of user ID changes on capabili-
	      ties above.

       SECBIT_NOROOT
	      If this bit is set, then the kernel does not  grant  capabilities
	      when  a  set-user-ID-root	 program is executed, or when a process
	      with an effective or real UID of 0 calls execve(2).   (See  Capa-
	      bilities and execution of programs by root above.)

       SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
	      Setting  this flag disallows raising ambient capabilities via the
	      prctl(2) PR_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE operation.

       Each of the above "base" flags has a companion "locked"	flag.	Setting
       any  of	the  "locked" flags is irreversible, and has the effect of pre-
       venting further changes to the corresponding "base"  flag.   The	 locked
       flags   are:   SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED,	 SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED,
       SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED, and SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE_LOCKED.

       The securebits flags can be modified and retrieved  using  the  prctl(2)
       PR_SET_SECUREBITS and PR_GET_SECUREBITS operations.  The CAP_SETPCAP ca-
       pability	 is  required to modify the flags.  Note that the SECBIT_* con-
       stants are  available  only  after  including  the  <linux/securebits.h>
       header file.

       The  securebits	flags  are inherited by child processes.  During an ex-
       ecve(2), all of the flags are preserved, except	SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS  which
       is always cleared.

       An application can use the following call to lock itself, and all of its
       descendants, into an environment where the only way of gaining capabili-
       ties is by executing a program with associated file capabilities:

	   prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS,
		   /* SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS off */
		   SECBIT_KEEP_CAPS_LOCKED |
		   SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP |
		   SECBIT_NO_SETUID_FIXUP_LOCKED |
		   SECBIT_NOROOT |
		   SECBIT_NOROOT_LOCKED);
		   /* Setting/locking SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE
		      is not required */

   Per-user-namespace "set-user-ID-root" programs
       A  set-user-ID  program	whose  UID  matches the UID that created a user
       namespace will confer capabilities in the process's permitted and effec-
       tive sets when executed by any process inside that namespace or any  de-
       scendant user namespace.

       The  rules about the transformation of the process's capabilities during
       the execve(2) are exactly as described in Transformation of capabilities
       during execve() and Capabilities	 and  execution	 of  programs  by  root
       above, with the difference that, in the latter subsection, "root" is the
       UID of the creator of the user namespace.

   Namespaced file capabilities
       Traditional  (i.e., version 2) file capabilities associate only a set of
       capability masks with a binary executable file.	When a process executes
       a binary with such capabilities, it gains  the  associated  capabilities
       (within its user namespace) as per the rules described in Transformation
       of capabilities during execve() above.

       Because version 2 file capabilities confer capabilities to the executing
       process	regardless  of	which user namespace it resides in, only privi-
       leged processes are permitted to associate  capabilities	 with  a  file.
       Here,  "privileged"  means a process that has the CAP_SETFCAP capability
       in the user namespace where the filesystem  was	mounted	 (normally  the
       initial user namespace).	 This limitation renders file capabilities use-
       less for certain use cases.  For example, in user-namespaced containers,
       it can be desirable to be able to create a binary that confers capabili-
       ties  only  to  processes  executed  inside  that  container, but not to
       processes that are executed outside the container.

       Linux 4.14 added so-called namespaced file capabilities to support  such
       use  cases.   Namespaced	 file  capabilities  are  recorded as version 3
       (i.e.,  VFS_CAP_REVISION_3)  security.capability	 extended   attributes.
       Such  an	 attribute  is	automatically  created in the circumstances de-
       scribed in File capability extended attribute versioning above.	When  a
       version	3 security.capability extended attribute is created, the kernel
       records not just the capability masks in	 the  extended	attribute,  but
       also the namespace root user ID.

       As with a binary that has VFS_CAP_REVISION_2 file capabilities, a binary
       with  VFS_CAP_REVISION_3	 file  capabilities  confers  capabilities to a
       process during execve().	 However, capabilities are  conferred  only  if
       the  binary  is	executed  by a process that resides in a user namespace
       whose UID 0 maps to the root user ID that is saved in the  extended  at-
       tribute,	 or  when executed by a process that resides in a descendant of
       such a namespace.

   Interaction with user namespaces
       For further information on the  interaction  of	capabilities  and  user
       namespaces, see user_namespaces(7).

STANDARDS
       No  standards  govern capabilities, but the Linux capability implementa-
       tion is based on the withdrawn POSIX.1e draft standard.

NOTES
       When attempting to strace(1) binaries that have	capabilities  (or  set-
       user-ID-root  binaries),	 you  may find the -u <username> option useful.
       Something like:

	   $ sudo strace -o trace.log -u ceci ./myprivprog

       From Linux 2.5.27 to Linux 2.6.26, capabilities were an optional	 kernel
       component,  and	could be enabled/disabled via the CONFIG_SECURITY_CAPA-
       BILITIES kernel configuration option.

       The /proc/pid/task/TID/status file can be used to  view	the  capability
       sets  of	 a thread.  The /proc/pid/status file shows the capability sets
       of a process's main thread.  Before Linux 3.8, nonexistent  capabilities
       were  shown  as	being  enabled (1) in these sets.  Since Linux 3.8, all
       nonexistent capabilities (above CAP_LAST_CAP) are shown as disabled (0).

       The libcap package provides a suite of routines for setting and	getting
       capabilities that is more comfortable and less likely to change than the
       interface  provided  by capset(2) and capget(2).	 This package also pro-
       vides the setcap(8) and getcap(8) programs.  It can be found at
       https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/libs/libcap/libcap.git/refs/.

       Before Linux 2.6.24, and from Linux 2.6.24 to Linux 2.6.32 if file capa-
       bilities are not enabled, a thread with the CAP_SETPCAP	capability  can
       manipulate the capabilities of threads other than itself.  However, this
       is  only theoretically possible, since no thread ever has CAP_SETPCAP in
       either of these cases:

       o  In the pre-2.6.25 implementation the system-wide capability  bounding
	  set, /proc/sys/kernel/cap-bound, always masks out the CAP_SETPCAP ca-
	  pability,  and  this	can not be changed without modifying the kernel
	  source and rebuilding the kernel.

       o  If file capabilities are  disabled  (i.e.,  the  kernel  CONFIG_SECU-
	  RITY_FILE_CAPABILITIES option is disabled), then init starts out with
	  the CAP_SETPCAP capability removed from its per-process bounding set,
	  and  that bounding set is inherited by all other processes created on
	  the system.

SEE ALSO
       capsh(1),    setpriv(1),	   prctl(2),	 setfsuid(2),	  cap_clear(3),
       cap_copy_ext(3),	  cap_from_text(3),  cap_get_file(3),  cap_get_proc(3),
       cap_init(3), capgetp(3), capsetp(3), libcap(3), proc(5), credentials(7),
       pthreads(7), user_namespaces(7), captest(8), filecap(8), getcap(8), get-
       pcaps(8), netcap(8), pscap(8), setcap(8)

       include/linux/capability.h in the Linux kernel source tree

Linux man-pages 6.9.1		   2024-06-13			Capabilities(7)