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CRYPT(5)		       File Formats Manual		       CRYPT(5)

NAME
       crypt  --  storage  format  for hashed passphrases and available hashing
       methods

DESCRIPTION
       The hashing methods implemented by crypt(3) are designed only to process
       user passphrases for storage and authentication; they are  not  suitable
       for use as general-purpose cryptographic hashes.

       Passphrase  hashing  is not a replacement for strong passphrases.  It is
       always possible for an attacker with access to the hashed passphrases to
       guess and check possible cleartext passphrases.	However, with a	 strong
       hashing method, guessing will be too slow for the attacker to discover a
       strong passphrase.

       Most  of	 the hashing methods use a "salt" to perturb the hash function,
       so that the same passphrase may produce	many  possible	hashes.	  Newer
       methods accept longer salt strings.  The salt should be chosen at random
       for each user.  Salt defeats a number of attacks:

       1.   It	is  not	 possible  to  hash  a passphrase once and then test it
	    against each account's stored hash; the hash  calculation  must  be
	    repeated for each account.

       2.   It	is  not	 possible  to  tell  whether  two accounts use the same
	    passphrase without successfully guessing one of the phrases.

       3.   Tables of precalculated hashes of commonly	used  passphrases  must
	    have  an  entry  for each possible salt, which makes them impracti-
	    cally large.

       Most of the hashing methods are also deliberately engineered to be slow;
       they use many iterations of an underlying cryptographic primitive to in-
       crease the cost of each guess.  The newer hashing methods allow the num-
       ber of iterations to be adjusted, using the "processing cost"  parameter
       to  crypt_gensalt(3).  For memory-hard hashing methods such as yescrypt,
       this parameter also adjusts the amount of memory	 needed	 to  compute  a
       hash.   Having  this  configurable  makes  it  possible to keep password
       guessing attacks against the hashes slow	 and  costly  as  hardware  im-
       proves.

FORMAT OF HASHED PASSPHRASES
       All  of	the  hashing  methods  supported  by  crypt(3) produce a hashed
       passphrase which consists of four components: prefix, options, salt, and
       hash.  The prefix controls which hashing method is to be	 used,	and  is
       the  appropriate	 string	 to  pass  to  crypt_gensalt(3)	 to select that
       method.	The contents of options, salt, and hash are up to  the	method.
       Depending on the method, the prefix and options components may be empty.

       The  setting argument to crypt(3) must begin with the first three compo-
       nents of a valid hashed passphrase, but anything after that is  ignored.
       This  makes  authentication  simple: hash the input passphrase using the
       stored hashed passphrase as the setting, and then compare the result  to
       the stored hashed passphrase.

       Hashed  passphrases are always entirely printable ASCII, and do not con-
       tain any whitespace or the  characters  `:',  `;',  `*',	 `!',  or  `\'.
       (These  characters  are	used  as  delimiters and special markers in the
       passwd(5) and shadow(5) files.)

       The syntax of each component of a hashed passphrase is up to the hashing
       method.	`$' characters usually delimit components,  and	 the  salt  and
       hash  are  usually  encoded as numerals in base 64.  The details of this
       base-64 encoding vary among hashing methods.  The common "base64" encod-
       ing specified by RFC 4648 is usually not used.

AVAILABLE HASHING METHODS
       This is a list of all the hashing methods supported by crypt(3), roughly
       in decreasing order of strength.	 Many of the older methods are now con-
       sidered too weak to use for new passphrases.  The hashed passphrase for-
       mat is expressed with extended regular expressiotroff:<standard input>:321: warning [p 7, 4.0i]: cannot adjust line
ns  (see  regex(7))  and
       does not show the division into prefix, options, salt, and hash.

   yescrypt
       yescrypt	 is  a scalable passphrase hashing scheme designed by Solar De-
       signer, which is based on Colin	Percival's  scrypt.   While  yescrypt's
       strength	 against password guessing attacks comes from its algorithm de-
       sign, its cryptographic security is guaranteed by its use of SHA-256  on
       the  outer  layer.  The SHA-256 hash function has been published by NIST
       in FIPS PUB 180-2 (and its subsequent revisions such as FIPS PUB	 180-4)
       and  by	the  IETF as RFC 4634 (and subsequently RFC 6234).  Recommended
       for new hashes.

       Prefix
	   "$y$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$y\$[./A-Za-z0-9]+\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{,86}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{43}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   256 bits

       Salt size
	   up to 512 (128+ recommended) bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   1 to 11 (logarithmic, also affects memory usage)

   gost-yescrypt
       gost-yescrypt uses the output from yescrypt as an input message to  HMAC
       with  the  GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) hash function with a 256-bit di-
       gest.  Thus, yescrypt's cryptographic properties are superseded by those
       of the GOST hash function.  This hashing method is  useful  in  applica-
       tions  that need modern passphrase hashing, but have to rely on GOST al-
       gorithms.  The GOST R 34.11-2012 (Streebog) hash function has been  pub-
       lished  by  the	IETF  as RFC 6986.  Acceptable for new hashes where re-
       quired.

       Prefix
	   "$gy$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$gy\$[./A-Za-z0-9]+\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{,86}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{43}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   256 bits

       Salt size
	   up to 512 (128+ recommended) bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   1 to 11 (logarithmic, also affects memory usage)

   scrypt
       scrypt is a password-based key derivation function created by Colin Per-
       cival, originally for the Tarsnap online backup service.	 The  algorithm
       was  specifically designed to make it costly to perform large-scale cus-
       tom hardware attacks by requiring large amounts of memory.  In 2016, the
       scrypt algorithm was published by IETF as RFC 7914.

       Prefix
	   "$7$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$7\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{11,97}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{43}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   256 bits

       Salt size
	   up to 512 (128+ recommended) bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   6 to 11 (logarithmic, also affects memory usage)

   bcrypt
       A hash based on the Blowfish block cipher, modified to have an extra-ex-
       pensive key schedule.  Originally developed by Niels  Provos  and  David
       Mazieres	 for  OpenBSD  and also supported on recent versions of FreeBSD
       and NetBSD, on Solaris 10 and newer, and on several GNU/*/Linux distrib-
       utions.

       Prefix
	   "$2b$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$2[abxy]\$[0-9]{2}\$[./A-Za-z0-9]{53}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   72 characters

       Hash size
	   184 bits

       Salt size
	   128 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   4 to 31 (logarithmic)

       The alternative prefix "$2y$" is equivalent to "$2b$".	It  exists  for
       historical  reasons  only.   The	 alternative prefixes "$2a$" and "$2x$"
       provide bug-compatibility with crypt_blowfish 1.0.4 and	earlier,  which
       incorrectly processed characters with the 8th bit set.

   sha512crypt
       A  hash	based on SHA-2 with 512-bit output, originally developed by Ul-
       rich Drepper for GNU libc.  Supported on Linux but not common elsewhere.
       Acceptable for new hashes.  The default	processing  cost  parameter  is
       5000, which is too low for modern hardware.

       Prefix
	   "$6$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$6\$(rounds=[1-9][0-9]+\$)?[^$:\n]{1,16}\$[./0-9A-Za-z]{86}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   512 bits

       Salt size
	   6 to 96 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   1000 to 999,999,999

   sha256crypt
       A  hash	based on SHA-2 with 256-bit output, originally developed by Ul-
       rich Drepper for GNU libc.  Supported on Linux but not common elsewhere.
       Acceptable for new hashes.  The default	processing  cost  parameter  is
       5000, which is too low for modern hardware.

       Prefix
	   "$5$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$5\$(rounds=[1-9][0-9]+\$)?[^$:\n]{1,16}\$[./0-9A-Za-z]{43}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   256 bits

       Salt size
	   6 to 96 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   1000 to 999,999,999

   sha1crypt
       A  hash	based  on HMAC-SHA1.  Originally developed by Simon Gerraty for
       NetBSD.	Not as weak as the DES-based hashes  below,  but  SHA-1	 is  so
       cheap on modern hardware that it should not be used for new hashes.

       Prefix
	   "$sha1"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$sha1\$[1-9][0-9]+\$[./0-9A-Za-z]{1,64}\$[./0-9A-Za-
	   z]{8,64}[./0-9A-Za-z]{32}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   160 bits

       Salt size
	   6 to 384 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   4 to 4,294,967,295

   SunMD5
       A  hash	based  on the MD5 algorithm, originally developed by Alec David
       Muffett for Solaris.  Not adopted elsewhere, to our knowledge.	Not  as
       weak  as the DES-based hashes below, but MD5 is so cheap on modern hard-
       ware that it should not be used for new hashes.

       Prefix
	   "$md5"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$md5(,rounds=[1-9][0-9]+)?\$[./0-9A-Za-z]{8}\${1,2}[./0-9A-Za-
	   z]{22}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   128 bits

       Salt size
	   48 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   4096 to 4,294,963,199

   md5crypt
       A hash based on the MD5 algorithm, originally developed by  Poul-Henning
       Kamp  for  FreeBSD.  Supported on most free Unixes and newer versions of
       Solaris.	 Not as weak as the DES-based hashes below, but MD5 is so cheap
       on modern hardware that it should not be used for new hashes.   Process-
       ing cost is not adjustable.

       Prefix
	   "$1$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$1\$[^$:\n]{1,8}\$[./0-9A-Za-z]{22}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   128 bits

       Salt size
	   6 to 48 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   1000

   bsdicrypt (BSDI extended DES)
       An  extension of traditional DES, which eliminates the length limit, in-
       creases the salt size, and makes the time cost tunable.	 It  originates
       with  BSDI BSD/OS and is also available on at least NetBSD, OpenBSD, and
       FreeBSD due to the use of David Burren's FreeSec library.   It  is  much
       better  than  traditional DES and bigcrypt, but still should not be used
       for new hashes.

       Prefix
	   "_"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   _[./0-9A-Za-z]{19}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited (ignores 8th bit)

       Hash size
	   64 bits

       Effective key size
	   up to 56 bits

       Salt size
	   24 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   1 to 16,777,215 (must be odd)

   descrypt (Traditional DES)
       The original hashing method from Unix V7, based on the DES block cipher.
       Because DES is cheap on modern hardware, because	 there	are  only  4096
       possible	 salts	and 2**56 distinct passphrases, which it truncates to 8
       characters, it is feasible to discover any passphrase hashed  with  this
       method.	 It  should  only  be  used  if you absolutely have to generate
       hashes that will work on an old operating system that  supports	nothing
       else.

       Prefix
	   "" (empty string)

       Hashed passphrase format
	   [./0-9A-Za-z]{13}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   8 characters (ignores 8th bit)

       Hash size
	   64 bits

       Effective key size
	   up to 56 bits

       Salt size
	   12 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   25

   bigcrypt
       A  weak	extension  of  traditional  DES,  available  on some commercial
       Unixes.	All it does is raise the length limit from 8 to 128 characters,
       and it does this in a crude way that allows attackers to guess chunks of
       a long passphrase separately and in parallel, which  may	 make  guessing
       even  easier  than for traditional DES above.  It should not be used for
       new hashes.

       Prefix
	   "" (empty string)

       Hashed passphrase format
	   [./0-9A-Za-z]{13,178}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   128 characters (ignores 8th bit)

       Hash size
	   up to 1024 bits

       Effective key size
	   up to 56 bits

       Salt size
	   12 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   25

   NT
       The hashing method used for network authentication in some  versions  of
       the  SMB/CIFS  protocol.	  Available, for cross-compatibility's sake, on
       FreeBSD.	 Based on MD4.	Has no salt or tunable cost parameter.	 It  is
       so  weak that almost any human-chosen passphrase hashed with this method
       is guessable.  It should only be used if you absolutely have to generate
       hashes that will work on an old operating system that  supports	nothing
       else.

       Prefix
	   "$3$"

       Hashed passphrase format
	   \$3\$\$[0-9a-f]{32}

       Maximum passphrase length
	   unlimited

       Hash size
	   256 bits

       Salt size
	   0 bits

       Processing cost parameter
	   1

SEE ALSO
       crypt(3), crypt_gensalt(3), getpwent(3), passwd(5), shadow(5), pam(8)

       Niels  Provos  and David Mazieres, "A Future-Adaptable Password Scheme",
       Proceedings  of	 the   1999   USENIX   Annual	Technical   Conference,
       https://www.usenix.org/events/usenix99/provos.html, June 1999.

       Robert  Morris  and  Ken	 Thompson, "Password Security: A Case History",
       Communications	     of	       the	   ACM,		11,	    22,
       http://wolfram.schneider.org/bsd/7thEdManVol2/password/password.pdf,
       1979.

Openwall Project		 March 27, 2024			       CRYPT(5)