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seccomp(2)		      System Calls Manual		     seccomp(2)

NAME
       seccomp - operate on Secure Computing state of the process

LIBRARY
       Standard C library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS
       #include <linux/seccomp.h>  /* Definition of SECCOMP_* constants */
       #include <linux/filter.h>   /* Definition of struct sock_fprog */
       #include <linux/audit.h>	   /* Definition of AUDIT_* constants */
       #include <linux/signal.h>   /* Definition of SIG* constants */
       #include <sys/ptrace.h>	   /* Definition of PTRACE_* constants */
       #include <sys/syscall.h>	   /* Definition of SYS_* constants */
       #include <unistd.h>

       int syscall(SYS_seccomp, unsigned int operation, unsigned int flags,
		   void *args);

       Note:  glibc provides no wrapper for seccomp(), necessitating the use of
       syscall(2).

DESCRIPTION
       The seccomp() system call operates on  the  Secure  Computing  (seccomp)
       state of the calling process.

       Currently, Linux supports the following operation values:

       SECCOMP_SET_MODE_STRICT
	      The  only	 system	 calls	that the calling thread is permitted to
	      make are read(2), write(2), _exit(2) (but not exit_group(2)), and
	      sigreturn(2).  Other system calls result in  the	termination  of
	      the calling thread, or termination of the entire process with the
	      SIGKILL signal when there is only one thread.  Strict secure com-
	      puting  mode is useful for number-crunching applications that may
	      need to execute untrusted byte code, perhaps obtained by	reading
	      from a pipe or socket.

	      Note that although the calling thread can no longer call sigproc-
	      mask(2),	it can use sigreturn(2) to block all signals apart from
	      SIGKILL and SIGSTOP.  This means that alarm(2) (for  example)  is
	      not sufficient for restricting the process's execution time.  In-
	      stead,  to  reliably terminate the process, SIGKILL must be used.
	      This can be done by using timer_create(2) with  SIGEV_SIGNAL  and
	      sigev_signo  set	to SIGKILL, or by using setrlimit(2) to set the
	      hard limit for RLIMIT_CPU.

	      This operation is available only if the kernel is configured with
	      CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled.

	      The value of flags must be 0, and args must be NULL.

	      This operation is functionally identical to the call:

		  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT);

       SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER
	      The system calls allowed are defined by a pointer to  a  Berkeley
	      Packet  Filter (BPF) passed via args.  This argument is a pointer
	      to a struct sock_fprog; it can be designed  to  filter  arbitrary
	      system  calls  and  system  call arguments.  If the filter is in-
	      valid, seccomp() fails, returning EINVAL in errno.

	      If fork(2) or clone(2)  is  allowed  by  the  filter,  any  child
	      processes	 will be constrained to the same system call filters as
	      the parent.  If execve(2) is allowed, the existing  filters  will
	      be preserved across a call to execve(2).

	      In order to use the SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER operation, either the
	      calling thread must have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its user
	      namespace,  or  the thread must already have the no_new_privs bit
	      set.  If that bit was not already set  by	 an  ancestor  of  this
	      thread, the thread must make the following call:

		  prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1);

	      Otherwise,  the  SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER	operation fails and re-
	      turns EACCES in errno.  This requirement ensures that an unprivi-
	      leged process cannot apply a malicious filter and then  invoke  a
	      set-user-ID or other privileged program using execve(2), thus po-
	      tentially	 compromising  that  program.  (Such a malicious filter
	      might, for example, cause an attempt to use setuid(2) to set  the
	      caller's	user  IDs to nonzero values to instead return 0 without
	      actually making the system call.	 Thus,	the  program  might  be
	      tricked  into  retaining	superuser  privileges  in circumstances
	      where it is possible to influence it to do dangerous  things  be-
	      cause it did not actually drop privileges.)

	      If  prctl(2) or seccomp() is allowed by the attached filter, fur-
	      ther filters may be added.  This will increase  evaluation  time,
	      but allows for further reduction of the attack surface during ex-
	      ecution of a thread.

	      The  SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER  operation  is available only if the
	      kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER enabled.

	      When flags is 0, this operation is functionally identical to  the
	      call:

		  prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, args);

	      The recognized flags are:

	      SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_LOG (since Linux 4.14)
		     All  filter return actions except SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW should
		     be logged.	 An administrator may override this filter flag
		     by preventing specific actions from being logged  via  the
		     /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/actions_logged file.

	      SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER (since Linux 5.0)
		     After successfully installing the filter program, return a
		     new  user-space notification file descriptor.  (The close-
		     on-exec flag is set for the file  descriptor.)   When  the
		     filter  returns SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF a notification will
		     be sent to this file descriptor.

		     At	 most  one  seccomp  filter  using   the   SECCOMP_FIL-
		     TER_FLAG_NEW_LISTENER flag can be installed for a thread.

		     See seccomp_unotify(2) for further details.

	      SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW (since Linux 4.17)
		     Disable Speculative Store Bypass mitigation.

	      SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
		     When adding a new filter, synchronize all other threads of
		     the  calling  process  to the same seccomp filter tree.  A
		     "filter tree" is the ordered list of filters attached to a
		     thread.  (Attaching identical  filters  in	 separate  sec-
		     comp()  calls  results in different filters from this per-
		     spective.)

		     If any thread cannot synchronize to the same filter  tree,
		     the  call will not attach the new seccomp filter, and will
		     fail, returning the first thread ID found that cannot syn-
		     chronize.	Synchronization will fail if another thread  in
		     the  same	process	 is in SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT or if it has
		     attached new seccomp filters to itself, diverging from the
		     calling thread's filter tree.

       SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL (since Linux 4.14)
	      Test to see if an action is supported by the kernel.  This opera-
	      tion is helpful to confirm that the kernel knows of  a  more  re-
	      cently added filter return action since the kernel treats all un-
	      known actions as SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS.

	      The  value  of  flags must be 0, and args must be a pointer to an
	      unsigned 32-bit filter return action.

       SECCOMP_GET_NOTIF_SIZES (since Linux 5.0)
	      Get the sizes of the seccomp user-space notification  structures.
	      Since  these  structures may evolve and grow over time, this com-
	      mand can be used to determine how much  memory  to  allocate  for
	      sending and receiving notifications.

	      The  value  of  flags  must be 0, and args must be a pointer to a
	      struct seccomp_notif_sizes, which has the following form:

	      struct seccomp_notif_sizes
		  __u16 seccomp_notif;	    /* Size of notification structure */
		  __u16 seccomp_notif_resp; /* Size of response structure */
		  __u16 seccomp_data;	    /* Size of 'struct seccomp_data' */
	      };

	      See seccomp_unotify(2) for further details.

   Filters
       When adding filters via SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, args points to a filter
       program:

	   struct sock_fprog {
	       unsigned short	   len;	   /* Number of BPF instructions */
	       struct sock_filter *filter; /* Pointer to array of
					      BPF instructions */
	   };

       Each program must contain one or more BPF instructions:

	   struct sock_filter {		   /* Filter block */
	       __u16 code;		   /* Actual filter code */
	       __u8  jt;		   /* Jump true */
	       __u8  jf;		   /* Jump false */
	       __u32 k;			   /* Generic multiuse field */
	   };

       When executing the instructions, the BPF program operates on the	 system
       call  information made available (i.e., use the BPF_ABS addressing mode)
       as a (read-only) buffer of the following form:

	   struct seccomp_data {
	       int   nr;		   /* System call number */
	       __u32 arch;		   /* AUDIT_ARCH_* value
					      (see <linux/audit.h>) */
	       __u64 instruction_pointer;  /* CPU instruction pointer */
	       __u64 args[6];		   /* Up to 6 system call arguments */
	   };

       Because numbering of system calls varies between architectures and  some
       architectures  (e.g.,  x86-64)  allow user-space code to use the calling
       conventions of multiple architectures (and the convention being used may
       vary over the life of a process that uses execve(2) to execute  binaries
       that  employ the different conventions), it is usually necessary to ver-
       ify the value of the arch field.

       It is strongly recommended to use an allow-list approach whenever possi-
       ble because such an approach is more robust  and	 simple.   A  deny-list
       will  have to be updated whenever a potentially dangerous system call is
       added (or a dangerous flag or option if those are deny-listed),	and  it
       is  often possible to alter the representation of a value without alter-
       ing its meaning, leading to a deny-list bypass.	See also Caveats below.

       The arch field is not unique for all calling  conventions.   The	 x86-64
       ABI  and the x32 ABI both use AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 as arch, and they run on
       the same processors.  Instead, the mask __X32_SYSCALL_BIT is used on the
       system call number to tell the two ABIs apart.

       This  means  that  a  policy  must  either  deny	  all	syscalls   with
       __X32_SYSCALL_BIT  or  it  must	recognize  syscalls  with  and	without
       __X32_SYSCALL_BIT set.  A list of system calls to be denied based on  nr
       that  does  not also contain nr values with __X32_SYSCALL_BIT set can be
       bypassed by a malicious program that sets __X32_SYSCALL_BIT.

       Additionally, kernels prior to Linux 5.4 incorrectly permitted nr in the
       ranges 512-547 as well as the corresponding non-x32 syscalls  ORed  with
       __X32_SYSCALL_BIT.    For   example,   nr  ==  521  and	nr  ==	(101  |
       __X32_SYSCALL_BIT) would result in invocations of ptrace(2) with	 poten-
       tially  confused	 x32-vs-x86_64	semantics  in the kernel.  Policies in-
       tended to work on kernels before Linux 5.4 must ensure that they deny or
       otherwise correctly handle these system calls.  On Linux 5.4 and	 newer,
       such  system  calls  will fail with the error ENOSYS, without doing any-
       thing.

       The instruction_pointer field provides the address of  the  machine-lan-
       guage  instruction that performed the system call.  This might be useful
       in conjunction with the use of /proc/pid/maps to perform checks based on
       which region (mapping) of the program made the system call.   (Probably,
       it is wise to lock down the mmap(2) and mprotect(2) system calls to pre-
       vent the program from subverting such checks.)

       When  checking  values  from args, keep in mind that arguments are often
       silently truncated before being processed, but after the seccomp	 check.
       For  example,  this happens if the i386 ABI is used on an x86-64 kernel:
       although the kernel will normally not look beyond the 32 lowest bits  of
       the  arguments,	the values of the full 64-bit registers will be present
       in the seccomp data.  A less surprising example is that	if  the	 x86-64
       ABI is used to perform a system call that takes an argument of type int,
       the  more-significant  half  of	the argument register is ignored by the
       system call, but visible in the seccomp data.

       A seccomp filter returns a 32-bit value consisting  of  two  parts:  the
       most  significant 16 bits (corresponding to the mask defined by the con-
       stant SECCOMP_RET_ACTION_FULL) contain one of the "action" values listed
       below; the least significant  16-bits  (defined	by  the	 constant  SEC-
       COMP_RET_DATA) are "data" to be associated with this return value.

       If  multiple  filters  exist, they are all executed, in reverse order of
       their addition to the filter tree--that is, the most recently  installed
       filter is executed first.  (Note that all filters will be called even if
       one  of	the  earlier filters returns SECCOMP_RET_KILL.	This is done to
       simplify the kernel code and to provide a tiny speed-up in the execution
       of sets of filters by avoiding a check for this uncommon case.)	The re-
       turn value for the evaluation of a given system call is	the  first-seen
       action  value  of  highest precedence (along with its accompanying data)
       returned by execution of all of the filters.

       In decreasing order of precedence, the action values  that  may	be  re-
       turned by a seccomp filter are:

       SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS (since Linux 4.14)
	      This  value results in immediate termination of the process, with
	      a core dump.  The system call is not executed.  By contrast  with
	      SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD  below,  all  threads in the thread group
	      are terminated.  (For a discussion of thread groups, see the  de-
	      scription of the CLONE_THREAD flag in clone(2).)

	      The process terminates as though killed by a SIGSYS signal.  Even
	      if  a  signal handler has been registered for SIGSYS, the handler
	      will be ignored in this case and the process  always  terminates.
	      To  a parent process that is waiting on this process (using wait-
	      pid(2) or similar), the returned wstatus will indicate  that  its
	      child was terminated as though by a SIGSYS signal.

       SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (or SECCOMP_RET_KILL)
	      This  value  results  in immediate termination of the thread that
	      made the system call.  The system call is	 not  executed.	  Other
	      threads in the same thread group will continue to execute.

	      The  thread  terminates as though killed by a SIGSYS signal.  See
	      SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS above.

	      Before Linux 4.11, any process terminated in this way  would  not
	      trigger a coredump (even though SIGSYS is documented in signal(7)
	      as  having  a  default  action  of termination with a core dump).
	      Since Linux 4.11, a single-threaded process  will	 dump  core  if
	      terminated in this way.

	      With the addition of SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS in Linux 4.14, SEC-
	      COMP_RET_KILL_THREAD was added as a synonym for SECCOMP_RET_KILL,
	      in order to more clearly distinguish the two actions.

	      Note:  the use of SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD to kill a single thread
	      in a multithreaded process is likely to leave the	 process  in  a
	      permanently inconsistent and possibly corrupt state.

       SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
	      This value results in the kernel sending a thread-directed SIGSYS
	      signal  to  the  triggering thread.  (The system call is not exe-
	      cuted.)  Various fields will be set in  the  siginfo_t  structure
	      (see sigaction(2)) associated with signal:

	      o	 si_signo will contain SIGSYS.

	      o	 si_call_addr will show the address of the system call instruc-
		 tion.

	      o	 si_syscall and si_arch will indicate which system call was at-
		 tempted.

	      o	 si_code will contain SYS_SECCOMP.

	      o	 si_errno will contain the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion of the fil-
		 ter return value.

	      The  program  counter  will be as though the system call happened
	      (i.e., the program counter will not point to the system call  in-
	      struction).   The return value register will contain an architec-
	      ture-dependent value; if resuming execution, set it to  something
	      appropriate for the system call.	(The architecture dependency is
	      because  replacing it with ENOSYS could overwrite some useful in-
	      formation.)

       SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO
	      This value results in the SECCOMP_RET_DATA portion  of  the  fil-
	      ter's  return value being passed to user space as the errno value
	      without executing the system call.

       SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF (since Linux 5.0)
	      Forward the system call  to  an  attached	 user-space  supervisor
	      process  to allow that process to decide what to do with the sys-
	      tem call.	 If there is no attached supervisor (either because the
	      filter was not installed	with  the  SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LIS-
	      TENER flag or because the file descriptor was closed), the filter
	      returns  ENOSYS  (similar	 to  what happens when a filter returns
	      SECCOMP_RET_TRACE and there  is  no  tracer).   See  seccomp_uno-
	      tify(2) for further details.

	      Note  that the supervisor process will not be notified if another
	      filter returns an action value with  a  precedence  greater  than
	      SECCOMP_RET_USER_NOTIF.

       SECCOMP_RET_TRACE
	      When returned, this value will cause the kernel to attempt to no-
	      tify a ptrace(2)-based tracer prior to executing the system call.
	      If  there	 is  no tracer present, the system call is not executed
	      and returns a failure status with errno set to ENOSYS.

	      A tracer will be notified if  it	requests  PTRACE_O_TRACESECCOMP
	      using  ptrace(PTRACE_SETOPTIONS).	 The tracer will be notified of
	      a PTRACE_EVENT_SECCOMP and the SECCOMP_RET_DATA  portion	of  the
	      filter's	return	value  will  be	 available  to	the  tracer via
	      PTRACE_GETEVENTMSG.

	      The tracer can skip the system call by changing the  system  call
	      number  to  -1.	Alternatively, the tracer can change the system
	      call requested by changing the system call to a valid system call
	      number.  If the tracer asks to skip the  system  call,  then  the
	      system  call will appear to return the value that the tracer puts
	      in the return value register.

	      Before Linux 4.8, the seccomp check will not be run  again  after
	      the tracer is notified.  (This means that, on older kernels, sec-
	      comp-based  sandboxes  must  not	allow use of ptrace(2)--even of
	      other sandboxed processes--without extreme care; ptracers can use
	      this mechanism to escape from the seccomp sandbox.)

	      Note that a tracer process will not be notified if another filter
	      returns an action value  with  a	precedence  greater  than  SEC-
	      COMP_RET_TRACE.

       SECCOMP_RET_LOG (since Linux 4.14)
	      This  value  results  in the system call being executed after the
	      filter return action is logged.  An  administrator  may  override
	      the  logging  of this action via the /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp/ac-
	      tions_logged file.

       SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW
	      This value results in the system call being executed.

       If an action value other than one of the above is  specified,  then  the
       filter action is treated as either SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS (since Linux
       4.14) or SECCOMP_RET_KILL_THREAD (in Linux 4.13 and earlier).

   /proc interfaces
       The  files  in the directory /proc/sys/kernel/seccomp provide additional
       seccomp information and configuration:

       actions_avail (since Linux 4.14)
	      A read-only ordered list of  seccomp  filter  return  actions  in
	      string  form.  The ordering, from left-to-right, is in decreasing
	      order of precedence.  The list represents the set of seccomp fil-
	      ter return actions supported by the kernel.

       actions_logged (since Linux 4.14)
	      A read-write ordered list of seccomp filter return  actions  that
	      are  allowed  to be logged.  Writes to the file do not need to be
	      in ordered form but reads from the file will be  ordered	in  the
	      same way as the actions_avail file.

	      It is important to note that the value of actions_logged does not
	      prevent  certain filter return actions from being logged when the
	      audit subsystem is configured to audit a task.  If the action  is
	      not  found  in  the  actions_logged  file,  the final decision on
	      whether to audit the action for that task is ultimately  left  up
	      to  the  audit  subsystem to decide for all filter return actions
	      other than SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW.

	      The "allow" string is not accepted in the actions_logged file  as
	      it  is not possible to log SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW actions.  Attempting
	      to write "allow" to the file will fail with the error EINVAL.

   Audit logging of seccomp actions
       Since Linux 4.14, the kernel provides the facility to  log  the	actions
       returned	 by seccomp filters in the audit log.  The kernel makes the de-
       cision to log an action based on the action type,  whether  or  not  the
       action  is present in the actions_logged file, and whether kernel audit-
       ing is enabled (e.g., via the kernel boot option	 audit=1).   The  rules
       are as follows:

       o  If the action is SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW, the action is not logged.

       o  Otherwise,  if  the action is either SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS or SEC-
	  COMP_RET_KILL_THREAD, and that action appears in  the	 actions_logged
	  file, the action is logged.

       o  Otherwise,  if  the  filter  has  requested logging (the SECCOMP_FIL-
	  TER_FLAG_LOG flag) and the action appears in the actions_logged file,
	  the action is logged.

       o  Otherwise, if kernel auditing is enabled and the process is being au-
	  dited (autrace(8)), the action is logged.

       o  Otherwise, the action is not logged.

RETURN VALUE
       On success, seccomp() returns 0.	 On error, if SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
       was used, the return value is the ID of the thread that caused the  syn-
       chronization  failure.	(This  ID is a kernel thread ID of the type re-
       turned by clone(2) and gettid(2).)  On other errors, -1 is returned, and
       errno is set to indicate the error.

ERRORS
       seccomp() can fail for the following reasons:

       EACCES The caller did not have the CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its  user
	      namespace,   or  had  not	 set  no_new_privs  before  using  SEC-
	      COMP_SET_MODE_FILTER.

       EBUSY  While installing a new filter,  the  SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_NEW_LIS-
	      TENER  flag was specified, but a previous filter had already been
	      installed with that flag.

       EFAULT args was not a valid address.

       EINVAL operation is unknown or is not supported by this	kernel	version
	      or configuration.

       EINVAL The specified flags are invalid for the given operation.

       EINVAL operation	 included  BPF_ABS,  but  the  specified offset was not
	      aligned to a  32-bit  boundary  or  exceeded  sizeof(struct  sec-
	      comp_data).

       EINVAL A	 secure computing mode has already been set, and operation dif-
	      fers from the existing setting.

       EINVAL operation specified SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, but the filter  pro-
	      gram pointed to by args was not valid or the length of the filter
	      program was zero or exceeded BPF_MAXINSNS (4096) instructions.

       ENOMEM Out of memory.

       ENOMEM The  total  length of all filter programs attached to the calling
	      thread  would  exceed  MAX_INSNS_PER_PATH	 (32768)  instructions.
	      Note  that  for  the purposes of calculating this limit, each al-
	      ready existing filter program incurs an overhead penalty of 4 in-
	      structions.

       EOPNOTSUPP
	      operation specified SECCOMP_GET_ACTION_AVAIL, but the kernel does
	      not support the filter return action specified by args.

       ESRCH  Another thread caused a failure during thread sync,  but	its  ID
	      could not be determined.

STANDARDS
       Linux.

HISTORY
       Linux 3.17.

NOTES
       Rather  than  hand-coding seccomp filters as shown in the example below,
       you may prefer to employ the libseccomp library, which provides a front-
       end for generating seccomp filters.

       The Seccomp field of the /proc/pid/status  file	provides  a  method  of
       viewing the seccomp mode of a process; see proc(5).

       seccomp()  provides  a  superset	 of  the  functionality provided by the
       prctl(2) PR_SET_SECCOMP operation (which does not support flags).

       Since Linux 4.4, the ptrace(2) PTRACE_SECCOMP_GET_FILTER	 operation  can
       be used to dump a process's seccomp filters.

   Architecture support for seccomp BPF
       Architecture  support for seccomp BPF filtering is available on the fol-
       lowing architectures:

       o  x86-64, i386, x32 (since Linux 3.5)
       o  ARM (since Linux 3.8)
       o  s390 (since Linux 3.8)
       o  MIPS (since Linux 3.16)
       o  ARM-64 (since Linux 3.19)
       o  PowerPC (since Linux 4.3)
       o  Tile (since Linux 4.3)
       o  PA-RISC (since Linux 4.6)

   Caveats
       There are various subtleties to consider when applying  seccomp	filters
       to a program, including the following:

       o  Some	traditional system calls have user-space implementations in the
	  vdso(7) on many architectures.  Notable examples  include  clock_get-
	  time(2),  gettimeofday(2),  and time(2).  On such architectures, sec-
	  comp filtering for these system calls will have no effect.  (However,
	  there are cases where the vdso(7) implementations may	 fall  back  to
	  invoking  the	 true  system call, in which case seccomp filters would
	  see the system call.)

       o  Seccomp filtering is based on system call numbers.  However, applica-
	  tions typically do not directly invoke system calls, but instead call
	  wrapper functions in the C library which in turn  invoke  the	 system
	  calls.  Consequently, one must be aware of the following:

	  o  The  glibc wrappers for some traditional system calls may actually
	     employ system calls with different names in the kernel.  For exam-
	     ple,  the	exit(2)	  wrapper   function   actually	  employs   the
	     exit_group(2)  system call, and the fork(2) wrapper function actu-
	     ally calls clone(2).

	  o  The behavior of wrapper functions may vary	 across	 architectures,
	     according to the range of system calls provided on those architec-
	     tures.   In other words, the same wrapper function may invoke dif-
	     ferent system calls on different architectures.

	  o  Finally, the behavior of wrapper functions can change across glibc
	     versions.	For example, in older versions, the glibc wrapper func-
	     tion for open(2) invoked the system call of  the  same  name,  but
	     starting  in  glibc  2.26,	 the implementation switched to calling
	     openat(2) on all architectures.

       The consequence of the above points is that it may be necessary to  fil-
       ter  for	 a  system  call  other than might be expected.	 Various manual
       pages in Section 2 provide helpful details about the differences between
       wrapper functions and the underlying system calls in  subsections  enti-
       tled C library/kernel differences.

       Furthermore,  note  that	 the  application of seccomp filters even risks
       causing bugs in an application, when the filters cause unexpected  fail-
       ures  for  legitimate operations that the application might need to per-
       form.  Such bugs may not easily be discovered when testing  the	seccomp
       filters if the bugs occur in rarely used application code paths.

   Seccomp-specific BPF details
       Note the following BPF details specific to seccomp filters:

       o  The  BPF_H and BPF_B size modifiers are not supported: all operations
	  must load and store (4-byte) words (BPF_W).

       o  To access the contents of the seccomp_data buffer,  use  the	BPF_ABS
	  addressing mode modifier.

       o  The BPF_LEN addressing mode modifier yields an immediate mode operand
	  whose value is the size of the seccomp_data buffer.

EXAMPLES
       The program below accepts four or more arguments.  The first three argu-
       ments  are  a system call number, a numeric architecture identifier, and
       an error number.	 The program uses these values to construct a BPF  fil-
       ter that is used at run time to perform the following checks:

       o  If  the program is not running on the specified architecture, the BPF
	  filter causes system calls to fail with the error ENOSYS.

       o  If the program attempts to execute the system call with the specified
	  number, the BPF filter causes the system call to fail, with errno be-
	  ing set to the specified error number.

       The remaining command-line arguments specify the pathname and additional
       arguments of a program that the example program should attempt  to  exe-
       cute  using execv(3) (a library function that employs the execve(2) sys-
       tem call).  Some example runs of the program are shown below.

       First, we display the architecture that we are running on  (x86-64)  and
       then  construct	a  shell  function that looks up system call numbers on
       this architecture:

	   $ uname -m
	   x86_64
	   $ syscall_nr() {
	       cat /usr/src/linux/arch/x86/syscalls/syscall_64.tbl | \
	       awk '$2 != "x32" && $3 == "'$1'" { print $1 }'
	   }

       When the BPF filter rejects a system call (case [2]  above),  it	 causes
       the  system  call to fail with the error number specified on the command
       line.  In the experiments shown here, we'll use error number 99:

	   $ errno 99
	   EADDRNOTAVAIL 99 Cannot assign requested address

       In the following example, we attempt to run the command	whoami(1),  but
       the BPF filter rejects the execve(2) system call, so that the command is
       not even executed:

	   $ syscall_nr execve
	   59
	   $ ./a.out
	   Usage: ./a.out <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]
	   Hint for <arch>: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x40000003
			    AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0xC000003E
	   $ ./a.out 59 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami
	   execv: Cannot assign requested address

       In the next example, the BPF filter rejects the write(2) system call, so
       that,  although it is successfully started, the whoami(1) command is not
       able to write output:

	   $ syscall_nr write
	   1
	   $ ./a.out 1 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami

       In the final example, the BPF filter rejects a system call that	is  not
       used by the whoami(1) command, so it is able to successfully execute and
       produce output:

	   $ syscall_nr preadv
	   295
	   $ ./a.out 295 0xC000003E 99 /bin/whoami
	   cecilia

   Program source
       #include <linux/audit.h>
       #include <linux/filter.h>
       #include <linux/seccomp.h>
       #include <stddef.h>
       #include <stdio.h>
       #include <stdlib.h>
       #include <sys/prctl.h>
       #include <sys/syscall.h>
       #include <unistd.h>

       #define X32_SYSCALL_BIT 0x40000000
       #define ARRAY_SIZE(arr) (sizeof(arr) / sizeof((arr)[0]))

       static int
       install_filter(int syscall_nr, unsigned int t_arch, int f_errno)
       {
	   unsigned int upper_nr_limit = 0xffffffff;

	   /* Assume that AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64 means the normal x86-64 ABI
	      (in the x32 ABI, all system calls have bit 30 set in the
	      'nr' field, meaning the numbers are >= X32_SYSCALL_BIT). */
	   if (t_arch == AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64)
	       upper_nr_limit = X32_SYSCALL_BIT - 1;

	   struct sock_filter filter[] = {
	       /* [0] Load architecture from 'seccomp_data' buffer into
		      accumulator. */
	       BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
			(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch))),

	       /* [1] Jump forward 5 instructions if architecture does not
		      match 't_arch'. */
	       BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, t_arch, 0, 5),

	       /* [2] Load system call number from 'seccomp_data' buffer into
		      accumulator. */
	       BPF_STMT(BPF_LD | BPF_W | BPF_ABS,
			(offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))),

	       /* [3] Check ABI - only needed for x86-64 in deny-list use
		      cases.  Use BPF_JGT instead of checking against the bit
		      mask to avoid having to reload the syscall number. */
	       BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JGT | BPF_K, upper_nr_limit, 3, 0),

	       /* [4] Jump forward 1 instruction if system call number
		      does not match 'syscall_nr'. */
	       BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP | BPF_JEQ | BPF_K, syscall_nr, 0, 1),

	       /* [5] Matching architecture and system call: don't execute
		  the system call, and return 'f_errno' in 'errno'. */
	       BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K,
			SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO | (f_errno & SECCOMP_RET_DATA)),

	       /* [6] Destination of system call number mismatch: allow other
		      system calls. */
	       BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW),

	       /* [7] Destination of architecture mismatch: kill process. */
	       BPF_STMT(BPF_RET | BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS),
	   };

	   struct sock_fprog prog = {
	       .len = ARRAY_SIZE(filter),
	       .filter = filter,
	   };

	   if (syscall(SYS_seccomp, SECCOMP_SET_MODE_FILTER, 0, &prog)) {
	       perror("seccomp");
	       return 1;
	   }

	   return 0;
       }

       int
       main(int argc, char *argv[])
       {
	   if (argc < 5) {
	       fprintf(stderr, "Usage: "
		       "%s <syscall_nr> <arch> <errno> <prog> [<args>]\n"
		       "Hint for <arch>: AUDIT_ARCH_I386: 0x%X\n"
		       "		 AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64: 0x%X\n"
		       "\n", argv[0], AUDIT_ARCH_I386, AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64);
	       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	   }

	   if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0)) {
	       perror("prctl");
	       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
	   }

	   if (install_filter(strtol(argv[1], NULL, 0),
			      strtoul(argv[2], NULL, 0),
			      strtol(argv[3], NULL, 0)))
	       exit(EXIT_FAILURE);

	   execv(argv[4], &argv[4]);
	   perror("execv");
	   exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
       }

SEE ALSO
       bpfc(1),	 strace(1),  bpf(2),  prctl(2),	 ptrace(2), seccomp_unotify(2),
       sigaction(2), proc(5), signal(7), socket(7)

       Various pages  from  the	 libseccomp  library,  including:  scmp_sys_re-
       solver(1),  seccomp_export_bpf(3), seccomp_init(3), seccomp_load(3), and
       seccomp_rule_add(3).

       The kernel source files Documentation/networking/filter.txt and Documen-
       tation/userspace-api/seccomp_filter.rst	 (or   Documentation/prctl/sec-
       comp_filter.txt before Linux 4.13).

       McCanne,	 S. and Jacobson, V. (1992) The BSD Packet Filter: A New Archi-
       tecture for User-level Packet Capture, Proceedings of the USENIX	 Winter
       1993 Conference http://www.tcpdump.org/papers/bpf-usenix93.pdf

Linux man-pages 6.9.1		   2024-06-15			     seccomp(2)