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access(2)		      System Calls Manual		      access(2)

NAME
       access, faccessat, faccessat2 - check user's permissions for a file

LIBRARY
       Standard C library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS
       #include <unistd.h>

       int access(const char *pathname, int mode);

       #include <fcntl.h>	     /* Definition of AT_* constants */
       #include <unistd.h>

       int faccessat(int dirfd, const char *pathname, int mode, int flags);
		       /* But see C library/kernel differences, below */

       #include <fcntl.h>	     /* Definition of AT_* constants */
       #include <sys/syscall.h>	     /* Definition of SYS_* constants */
       #include <unistd.h>

       int syscall(SYS_faccessat2,
		   int dirfd, const char *pathname, int mode, int flags);

   Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see feature_test_macros(7)):

       faccessat():
	   Since glibc 2.10:
	       _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200809L
	   Before glibc 2.10:
	       _ATFILE_SOURCE

DESCRIPTION
       access()	 checks	 whether  the calling process can access the file path-
       name.  If pathname is a symbolic link, it is dereferenced.

       The mode specifies the accessibility check(s) to be  performed,	and  is
       either  the value F_OK, or a mask consisting of the bitwise OR of one or
       more of R_OK, W_OK, and X_OK.  F_OK tests for the existence of the file.
       R_OK, W_OK, and X_OK test whether  the  file  exists  and  grants  read,
       write, and execute permissions, respectively.

       The  check  is done using the calling process's real UID and GID, rather
       than the effective IDs as is done when actually attempting an  operation
       (e.g.,  open(2))	 on  the file.	Similarly, for the root user, the check
       uses the set of permitted capabilities rather than the set of  effective
       capabilities; and for non-root users, the check uses an empty set of ca-
       pabilities.

       This allows set-user-ID programs and capability-endowed programs to eas-
       ily  determine  the invoking user's authority.  In other words, access()
       does not answer the "can I read/write/execute this file?" question.   It
       answers	a  slightly different question: "(assuming I'm a setuid binary)
       can the user who invoked me read/write/execute this file?", which  gives
       set-user-ID  programs  the  possibility	to prevent malicious users from
       causing them to read files which users shouldn't be able to read.

       If the calling process is privileged (i.e., its real UID is zero),  then
       an  X_OK check is successful for a regular file if execute permission is
       enabled for any of the file owner, group, or other.

   faccessat()
       faccessat() operates in exactly the same way as access(), except for the
       differences described here.

       If the pathname given in pathname is relative, then  it	is  interpreted
       relative	 to  the  directory  referred  to  by the file descriptor dirfd
       (rather than relative to the current working directory  of  the	calling
       process, as is done by access() for a relative pathname).

       If  pathname  is	 relative and dirfd is the special value AT_FDCWD, then
       pathname is interpreted relative to the current working directory of the
       calling process (like access()).

       If pathname is absolute, then dirfd is ignored.

       flags is constructed by ORing together zero or  more  of	 the  following
       values:

       AT_EACCESS
	      Perform access checks using the effective user and group IDs.  By
	      default, faccessat() uses the real IDs (like access()).

       AT_EMPTY_PATH (since Linux 5.8)
	      If  pathname  is an empty string, operate on the file referred to
	      by dirfd (which may have been obtained using the	open(2)	 O_PATH
	      flag).   In  this	 case, dirfd can refer to any type of file, not
	      just a directory.	 If dirfd is AT_FDCWD, the call operates on the
	      current working directory.  This flag is	Linux-specific;	 define
	      _GNU_SOURCE to obtain its definition.

       AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
	      If  pathname  is	a symbolic link, do not dereference it: instead
	      return information about the link itself.

       See openat(2) for an explanation of the need for faccessat().

   faccessat2()
       The description of faccessat() given above corresponds to POSIX.1 and to
       the implementation provided by glibc.  However, the glibc implementation
       was an imperfect emulation (see BUGS) that papered over	the  fact  that
       the  raw	 Linux	faccessat() system call does not have a flags argument.
       To allow for a proper implementation, Linux 5.8 added  the  faccessat2()
       system  call, which supports the flags argument and allows a correct im-
       plementation of the faccessat() wrapper function.

RETURN VALUE
       On success (all requested permissions granted, or mode is F_OK  and  the
       file  exists),  zero  is	 returned.   On error (at least one bit in mode
       asked for a permission that is denied, or mode is F_OK and the file does
       not exist, or some other error occurred), -1 is returned, and  errno  is
       set to indicate the error.

ERRORS
       EACCES The  requested access would be denied to the file, or search per-
	      mission is denied for one of the directories in the  path	 prefix
	      of pathname.  (See also path_resolution(7).)

       EBADF  (faccessat())  pathname is relative but dirfd is neither AT_FDCWD
	      (faccessat()) nor a valid file descriptor.

       EFAULT pathname points outside your accessible address space.

       EINVAL mode was incorrectly specified.

       EINVAL (faccessat()) Invalid flag specified in flags.

       EIO    An I/O error occurred.

       ELOOP  Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving pathname.

       ENAMETOOLONG
	      pathname is too long.

       ENOENT A component of pathname does not exist or is a dangling  symbolic
	      link.

       ENOMEM Insufficient kernel memory was available.

       ENOTDIR
	      A	 component  used  as a directory in pathname is not, in fact, a
	      directory.

       ENOTDIR
	      (faccessat()) pathname is relative and dirfd is a file descriptor
	      referring to a file other than a directory.

       EPERM  Write permission was requested to a file that has	 the  immutable
	      flag set.	 See also FS_IOC_SETFLAGS(2const).

       EROFS  Write permission was requested for a file on a read-only filesys-
	      tem.

       ETXTBSY
	      Write  access  was requested to an executable which is being exe-
	      cuted.

VERSIONS
       If the calling process has appropriate privileges (i.e., is  superuser),
       POSIX.1-2001  permits  an implementation to indicate success for an X_OK
       check even if none of the execute file permission bits are  set.	  Linux
       does not do this.

   C library/kernel differences
       The  raw	 faccessat()  system call takes only the first three arguments.
       The AT_EACCESS and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags  are  actually  implemented
       within  the  glibc wrapper function for faccessat().  If either of these
       flags is specified, then the wrapper function employs fstatat(2) to  de-
       termine access permissions, but see BUGS.

   glibc notes
       On  older kernels where faccessat() is unavailable (and when the AT_EAC-
       CESS and AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW flags are not specified), the glibc wrapper
       function falls back to the use of access().  When pathname is a relative
       pathname, glibc constructs a pathname based  on	the  symbolic  link  in
       /proc/self/fd that corresponds to the dirfd argument.

STANDARDS
       access()
       faccessat()
	      POSIX.1-2008.

       faccessat2()
	      Linux.

HISTORY
       access()
	      SVr4, 4.3BSD, POSIX.1-2001.

       faccessat()
	      Linux 2.6.16, glibc 2.4.

       faccessat2()
	      Linux 5.8.

NOTES
       Warning:	 Using these calls to check if a user is authorized to, for ex-
       ample, open a file before actually doing so using open(2) creates a  se-
       curity  hole, because the user might exploit the short time interval be-
       tween checking and opening the file to manipulate it.  For this	reason,
       the use of this system call should be avoided.  (In the example just de-
       scribed,	 a  safer  alternative	would  be  to  temporarily  switch  the
       process's effective user ID to the real ID and then call open(2).)

       access() always dereferences symbolic links.  If you need to  check  the
       permissions  on	a  symbolic link, use faccessat() with the flag AT_SYM-
       LINK_NOFOLLOW.

       These calls return an error if any of the access types in  mode	is  de-
       nied, even if some of the other access types in mode are permitted.

       A  file is accessible only if the permissions on each of the directories
       in the path prefix of pathname grant search (i.e., execute) access.   If
       any  directory is inaccessible, then the access() call fails, regardless
       of the permissions on the file itself.

       Only access bits are checked, not the file type or contents.  Therefore,
       if a directory is found to be writable, it probably means that files can
       be created in the directory, and not that the directory can  be	written
       as a file.  Similarly, a DOS file may be reported as executable, but the
       execve(2) call will still fail.

       These calls may not work correctly on NFSv2 filesystems with UID mapping
       enabled,	 because  UID mapping is done on the server and hidden from the
       client, which checks permissions.  (NFS versions 3  and	higher	perform
       the check on the server.)  Similar problems can occur to FUSE mounts.

BUGS
       Because	the  Linux  kernel's faccessat() system call does not support a
       flags argument, the glibc faccessat() wrapper function provided in glibc
       2.32 and earlier emulates the required functionality using a combination
       of the faccessat() system call and fstatat(2).  However, this  emulation
       does  not take ACLs into account.  Starting with glibc 2.33, the wrapper
       function avoids this bug by making use of the faccessat2()  system  call
       where it is provided by the underlying kernel.

       In  Linux 2.4 (and earlier) there is some strangeness in the handling of
       X_OK tests for superuser.  If all categories of execute	permission  are
       disabled	 for  a nondirectory file, then the only access() test that re-
       turns -1 is when mode is specified as just X_OK; if R_OK or W_OK is also
       specified in mode, then access() returns 0 for such files.  Early  Linux
       2.6  (up	 to  and including Linux 2.6.3) also behaved in the same way as
       Linux 2.4.

       Before Linux 2.6.20, these calls ignored the  effect  of	 the  MS_NOEXEC
       flag  if it was used to mount(2) the underlying filesystem.  Since Linux
       2.6.20, the MS_NOEXEC flag is honored.

SEE ALSO
       chmod(2), chown(2),  open(2),  setgid(2),  setuid(2),  stat(2),	euidac-
       cess(3), credentials(7), path_resolution(7), symlink(7)

Linux man-pages 6.9.1		   2024-06-13			      access(2)