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chroot(2)		      System Calls Manual		      chroot(2)

NAME
       chroot - change root directory

LIBRARY
       Standard C library (libc, -lc)

SYNOPSIS
       #include <unistd.h>

       int chroot(const char *path);

   Feature Test Macro Requirements for glibc (see feature_test_macros(7)):

       chroot():
	   Since glibc 2.2.2:
	       _XOPEN_SOURCE && ! (_POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
		   || /* Since glibc 2.20: */ _DEFAULT_SOURCE
		   || /* glibc <= 2.19: */ _BSD_SOURCE
	   Before glibc 2.2.2:
	       none

DESCRIPTION
       chroot() changes the root directory of the calling process to that spec-
       ified in path.  This directory will be used for pathnames beginning with
       /.   The	 root  directory  is  inherited	 by all children of the calling
       process.

       Only a privileged process (Linux: one with the CAP_SYS_CHROOT capability
       in its user namespace) may call chroot().

       This call changes an ingredient in the pathname resolution  process  and
       does nothing else.  In particular, it is not intended to be used for any
       kind  of security purpose, neither to fully sandbox a process nor to re-
       strict filesystem system calls.	In the past, chroot() has been used  by
       daemons	to  restrict  themselves prior to passing paths supplied by un-
       trusted users to system calls such as open(2).  However, if a folder  is
       moved  out  of the chroot directory, an attacker can exploit that to get
       out of the chroot directory as well.  The easiest way to do that	 is  to
       chdir(2) to the to-be-moved directory, wait for it to be moved out, then
       open a path like ../../../etc/passwd.

       A  slightly  trickier  variation	 also works under some circumstances if
       chdir(2) is not permitted.  If a daemon allows a "chroot	 directory"  to
       be  specified,  that  usually  means  that if you want to prevent remote
       users from accessing files outside the chroot directory, you must ensure
       that folders are never moved out of it.

       This call does not change the current working directory, so  that  after
       the  call '.' can be outside the tree rooted at '/'.  In particular, the
       superuser can escape from a "chroot jail" by doing:

	   mkdir foo; chroot foo; cd ..

       This call does not close open file descriptors, and such	 file  descrip-
       tors may allow access to files outside the chroot tree.

RETURN VALUE
       On  success,  zero  is returned.	 On error, -1 is returned, and errno is
       set to indicate the error.

ERRORS
       Depending on the filesystem, other errors can  be  returned.   The  more
       general errors are listed below:

       EACCES Search  permission  is  denied on a component of the path prefix.
	      (See also path_resolution(7).)

       EFAULT path points outside your accessible address space.

       EIO    An I/O error occurred.

       ELOOP  Too many symbolic links were encountered in resolving path.

       ENAMETOOLONG
	      path is too long.

       ENOENT The file does not exist.

       ENOMEM Insufficient kernel memory was available.

       ENOTDIR
	      A component of path is not a directory.

       EPERM  The caller has insufficient privilege.

STANDARDS
       None.

HISTORY
       SVr4, 4.4BSD, SUSv2 (marked LEGACY).   This  function  is  not  part  of
       POSIX.1-2001.

NOTES
       A  child	 process  created via fork(2) inherits its parent's root direc-
       tory.  The root directory is left unchanged by execve(2).

       The magic symbolic link, /proc/pid/root,	 can  be  used	to  discover  a
       process's root directory; see proc(5) for details.

       FreeBSD has a stronger jail() system call.

SEE ALSO
       chroot(1), chdir(2), pivot_root(2), path_resolution(7), switch_root(8)

Linux man-pages 6.9.1		   2024-05-02			      chroot(2)