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OPENSSL-VERIFICATION-OPTIONS(1SSL)  OpenSSL  OPENSSL-VERIFICATION-OPTIONS(1SSL)

NAME
       openssl-verification-options - generic X.509 certificate verification
       options

SYNOPSIS
       openssl command [ options ... ] [ parameters ... ]

DESCRIPTION
       There are many situations where X.509 certificates are verified within
       the OpenSSL libraries and in various OpenSSL commands.

       Certificate verification is implemented by X509_verify_cert(3).	It is a
       complicated process consisting of a number of steps and depending on
       numerous options.  The most important of them are detailed in the
       following sections.

       In a nutshell, a valid chain of certificates needs to be built up and
       verified starting from the target certificate that is to be verified and
       ending in a certificate that due to some policy is trusted.  Certificate
       validation can be performed in the context of a purpose, which is a
       high-level specification of the intended use of the target certificate,
       such as "sslserver" for TLS servers, or (by default) for any purpose.

       The details of how each OpenSSL command handles errors are documented on
       the specific command page.

       DANE support is documented in openssl-s_client(1),
       SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3), SSL_set1_host(3),
       X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(3), and X509_check_host(3).

   Trust Anchors
       In general, according to RFC 4158 and RFC 5280, a trust anchor is any
       public key and related subject distinguished name (DN) that for some
       reason is considered trusted and thus is acceptable as the root of a
       chain of certificates.

       In practice, trust anchors are given in the form of certificates, where
       their essential fields are the public key and the subject DN.  In
       addition to the requirements in RFC 5280, OpenSSL checks the validity
       period of such certificates and makes use of some further fields.  In
       particular, the subject key identifier extension, if present, is used
       for matching trust anchors during chain building.

       In the most simple and common case, trust anchors are by default all
       self-signed "root" CA certificates that are placed in the trust store,
       which is a collection of certificates that are trusted for certain uses.
       This is akin to what is used in the trust stores of Mozilla Firefox, or
       Apple's and Microsoft's certificate stores, ...

       From the OpenSSL perspective, a trust anchor is a certificate that
       should be augmented with an explicit designation for which uses of a
       target certificate the certificate may serve as a trust anchor.	In PEM
       encoding, this is indicated by the "TRUSTED CERTIFICATE" string.	 Such a
       designation provides a set of positive trust attributes explicitly
       stating trust for the listed purposes and/or a set of negative trust
       attributes explicitly rejecting the use for the listed purposes.	 The
       purposes are encoded using the values defined for the extended key
       usages (EKUs) that may be given in X.509 extensions of end-entity
       certificates.  See also the "Extended Key Usage" section below.

       The currently recognized uses are clientAuth (SSL client use),
       serverAuth (SSL server use), emailProtection (S/MIME email use),
       codeSigning (object signer use), OCSPSigning (OCSP responder use), OCSP
       (OCSP request use), timeStamping (TSA server use), and
       anyExtendedKeyUsage.  As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, the last of these blocks all
       uses when rejected or enables all uses when trusted.

       A certificate, which may be CA certificate or an end-entity certificate,
       is considered a trust anchor for the given use if and only if all the
       following conditions hold:

       o   It is an an element of the trust store.

       o   It does not have a negative trust attribute rejecting the given use.

       o   It  has  a  positive	 trust attribute accepting the given use or (by
	   default) one of the following compatibility conditions apply: It  is
	   self-signed or the -partial_chain option is given (which corresponds
	   to the X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN flag being set).

   Certification Path Building
       First,  a  certificate  chain  is  built	 up  starting  from  the target
       certificate and ending in a trust anchor.

       The chain is built up iteratively, looking up in turn a certificate with
       suitable key usage that matches as an issuer of	the  current  "subject"
       certificate  as	described  below.   If there is such a certificate, the
       first one found that is currently valid is taken, otherwise the one that
       expired most recently of all  such  certificates.   For	efficiency,  no
       backtracking   is   performed,	thus   any   further  candidate	 issuer
       certificates that would match equally are ignored.

       When a self-signed certificate has been added, chain construction stops.
       In this case it	must  fully  match  a  trust  anchor,  otherwise  chain
       building fails.

       A  candidate  issuer certificate matches a subject certificate if all of
       the following conditions hold:

       o   Its subject name matches the issuer name of the subject certificate.

       o   If  the  subject  certificate  has  an  authority   key   identifier
	   extension,  each  of its sub-fields equals the corresponding subject
	   key identifier, serial number, and issuer  field  of	 the  candidate
	   issuer  certificate,	 as far as the respective fields are present in
	   both certificates.

       o   The	certificate  signature	algorithm  used	 to  sign  the	subject
	   certificate	is supported and equals the public key algorithm of the
	   candidate issuer certificate.

       The lookup first searches for issuer certificates in  the  trust	 store.
       If  it  does  not  find	a match there it consults the list of untrusted
       ("intermediate"	CA)  certificates,  if	 provided.    If   one	 issuer
       certificate  was	 found	in  the	 trust	store,	the  list  of untrusted
       certificates will not  be  consulted  anymore  to  find	further	 issuer
       certificates.   Therefore,  either  only	 the  root  certificate	 or  an
       uninterrupted chain to the root certificate  must  be  provided	in  the
       trust  store for a successful verification, if X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN
       is not enabled.

   Certification Path Validation
       When the certificate chain building process  was	 successful  the  chain
       components and their links are checked thoroughly.

       The  first  step is to check that each certificate is well-formed.  Part
       of these checks are enabled only if the -x509_strict option is given.

       The second step is to check the X.509v3 extensions of every  certificate
       for  consistency	 with  the  intended  specific purpose, if any.	 If the
       -purpose option is not given then no such checks are done except for CMS
       signature  checking,  where  by	default	 "smimesign"  is  checked,  and
       SSL/(D)TLS connection setup, where by default "sslserver" or "sslclient"
       are checked.  The X.509v3 extensions of the target or "leaf" certificate
       must  be	 compatible with the specified purpose.	 All other certificates
       down the chain are checked to be valid  CA  certificates,  and  possibly
       also  further non-standard checks are performed.	 The precise extensions
       required are described in detail in the "Certificate Extensions" section
       below.

       The third step is to check the trust settings on	 the  last  certificate
       (which  typically  is  a	 self-signed  root CA certificate).  It must be
       trusted for the given use.  For compatibility with previous versions  of
       OpenSSL,	  a   self-signed  certificate	with  no  trust	 attributes  is
       considered to be valid for all uses.

       The fourth, and final, step is to check the validity of the  certificate
       chain.	 For   each  element  in  the  chain,  including  the  root  CA
       certificate, the validity period as specified  by  the  "notBefore"  and
       "notAfter"  fields  is  checked	against	 the  current system time.  The
       -attime flag may be used to use a reference time other than "now."   The
       certificate  signature  is  checked as well (except for the signature of
       the typically self-signed root CA certificate, which is verified only if
       the -check_ss_sig  option  is  given).	When  verifying	 a  certificate
       signature  the  keyUsage	 extension (if present) of the candidate issuer
       certificate is checked to  permit  digitalSignature  for	 signing  proxy
       certificates  or	 to  permit keyCertSign for signing other certificates,
       respectively.  If all operations complete successfully then  certificate
       is  considered valid. If any operation fails then the certificate is not
       valid.

OPTIONS
   Trusted Certificate Options
       The following options specify how to supply the certificates that can be
       used as trust anchors for certain uses.	As mentioned, a	 collection  of
       such certificates is called a trust store.

       Note that OpenSSL does not provide a default set of trust anchors.  Many
       Linux  distributions  include  a system default and configure OpenSSL to
       point to that.  Mozilla maintains an influential trust store that can be
       found								     at
       <https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/about/governance/policies/security-group/certs/>.

       The  certificates  to  add  to  the  trust  store can be specified using
       following options.

       -CAfile file
	   Load the specified file which contains a trusted certificate in  DER
	   format  or  potentially  several of them in case the input is in PEM
	   format.  PEM-encoded certificates may  also	have  trust  attributes
	   set.

       -no-CAfile
	   Do not load the default file of trusted certificates.

       -CApath dir
	   Use the specified directory as a collection of trusted certificates,
	   i.e.,  a  trust store.  Files should be named with the hash value of
	   the X.509 SubjectName of each  certificate.	This  is  so  that  the
	   library can extract the IssuerName, hash it, and directly lookup the
	   file	 to  get  the  issuer  certificate.   See openssl-rehash(1) for
	   information on creating this type of directory.

       -no-CApath
	   Do not use the default directory of trusted certificates.

       -CAstore uri
	   Use uri as a store of CA  certificates.   The  URI  may  indicate  a
	   single  certificate,	 as well as a collection of them.  With URIs in
	   the "file:" scheme, this acts as -CAfile or -CApath, depending on if
	   the	 URI   indicates   a   single	file   or    directory.	    See
	   ossl_store-file(7) for more information on the "file:" scheme.

	   These   certificates	  are	also  used  when  building  the	 server
	   certificate chain (for example with openssl-s_server(1))  or	 client
	   certificate chain (for example with openssl-s_time(1)).

       -no-CAstore
	   Do not use the default store of trusted CA certificates.

   Verification Options
       The certificate verification can be fine-tuned with the following flags.

       -verbose
	   Print extra information about the operations being performed.

       -attime timestamp
	   Perform  validation checks using time specified by timestamp and not
	   current system time.	 timestamp  is	the  number  of	 seconds  since
	   January 1, 1970 (i.e., the Unix Epoch).

       -no_check_time
	   This	 option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates
	   and CRLs against the current time. If  option  -attime  is  used  to
	   specify a verification time, the check is not suppressed.

       -x509_strict
	   This	 disables  non-compliant  workarounds  for broken certificates.
	   Thus errors are thrown on certificates not compliant with RFC 5280.

	   When this option is set, among  others,  the	 following  certificate
	   well-formedness conditions are checked:

	   o   The basicConstraints of CA certificates must be marked critical.

	   o   CA certificates must explicitly include the keyUsage extension.

	   o   If  a  pathlenConstraint is given the key usage keyCertSign must
	       be allowed.

	   o   The pathlenConstraint must not be given for non-CA certificates.

	   o   The issuer name of any certificate must not be empty.

	   o   The subject name of CA certs, certs with keyUsage  crlSign,  and
	       certs without subjectAlternativeName must not be empty.

	   o   If  a  subjectAlternativeName  extension is given it must not be
	       empty.

	   o   The signatureAlgorithm field and	 the  cert  signature  must  be
	       consistent.

	   o   Any     given	 authorityKeyIdentifier	    and	   any	  given
	       subjectKeyIdentifier must not be marked critical.

	   o   The authorityKeyIdentifier  must	 be  given  for	 X.509v3  certs
	       unless they are self-signed.

	   o   The subjectKeyIdentifier must be given for all X.509v3 CA certs.

       -ignore_critical
	   Normally  if	 an unhandled critical extension is present that is not
	   supported by OpenSSL the certificate is  rejected  (as  required  by
	   RFC5280).  If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.

       -issuer_checks
	   Ignored.

       -crl_check
	   Checks  end	entity	certificate validity by attempting to look up a
	   valid CRL.  If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.

       -crl_check_all
	   Checks the validity of all certificates in the chain	 by  attempting
	   to look up valid CRLs.

       -use_deltas
	   Enable support for delta CRLs.

       -extended_crl
	   Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
	   signing keys.

       -suiteB_128_only, -suiteB_128, -suiteB_192
	   Enable  the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128
	   bit or 192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.  See
	   RFC6460  for	 details.  In  particular   the	  supported   signature
	   algorithms  are  reduced  to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384
	   and only the elliptic curves P-256 and P-384.

       -auth_level level
	   Set the certificate chain authentication security  level  to	 level.
	   The	 authentication	  security   level  determines	the  acceptable
	   signature and public key strength when verifying certificate chains.
	   For a certificate chain to validate, the  public  keys  of  all  the
	   certificates	 must meet the specified security level.  The signature
	   algorithm security level is enforced for all the certificates in the
	   chain except for the chain's trust anchor, which is either  directly
	   trusted  or	validated  by  means  other  than  its	signature.  See
	   SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3) for the definitions of	 the  available
	   levels.   The  default  security  level  is	-1,  or	 "not set".  At
	   security level 0 or lower all algorithms are	 acceptable.   Security
	   level  1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
	   interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or
	   RSA keys shorter than 1024 bits.

       -partial_chain
	   Allow verification to succeed if an incomplete chain can  be	 built.
	   That	 is, a chain ending in a certificate that normally would not be
	   trusted (because it has no matching positive trust attributes and is
	   not self-signed) but	 is  an	 element  of  the  trust  store.   This
	   certificate may be self-issued or belong to an intermediate CA.

       -check_ss_sig
	   Verify  the	signature  of  the  last  certificate in a chain if the
	   certificate is supposedly self-signed.  This is prohibited and  will
	   result in an error if it is a non-conforming CA certificate with key
	   usage   restrictions	  not  including  the  keyCertSign  bit.   This
	   verification is disabled by	default	 because  it  doesn't  add  any
	   security.

       -allow_proxy_certs
	   Allow the verification of proxy certificates.

       -trusted_first
	   As  of  OpenSSL  1.1.0  this	 option	 is on by default and cannot be
	   disabled.

	   When constructing the certificate chain,  the  trusted  certificates
	   specified via -CAfile, -CApath, -CAstore or -trusted are always used
	   before any certificates specified via -untrusted.

       -no_alt_chains
	   As of OpenSSL 1.1.0, since -trusted_first always on, this option has
	   no effect.

       -trusted file
	   Parse  file	as  a  set  of	one or more certificates.  Each of them
	   qualifies as trusted if has a suitable positive trust  attribute  or
	   it  is  self-signed or the -partial_chain option is specified.  This
	   option implies the -no-CAfile, -no-CApath, and  -no-CAstore	options
	   and it cannot be used with the -CAfile, -CApath or -CAstore options,
	   so  only  certificates specified using the -trusted option are trust
	   anchors.  This option may be used multiple times.

       -untrusted file
	   Parse file as a set of one or more certificates.   All  certificates
	   (typically  of intermediate CAs) are considered untrusted and may be
	   used to construct a certificate chain from the target certificate to
	   a trust anchor.  This option may be used multiple times.

       -policy arg
	   Enable policy processing and add arg to the	user-initial-policy-set
	   (see	 RFC5280).  The	 policy	 arg can be an object name or an OID in
	   numeric form.  This argument can appear more than once.

       -explicit_policy
	   Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).

       -policy_check
	   Enables certificate policy processing.

       -policy_print
	   Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.

       -inhibit_any
	   Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).

       -inhibit_map
	   Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).

       -purpose purpose
	   A high-level	 specification	of  the	 intended  use	of  the	 target
	   certificate.	   Currently   predefined   purposes  are  "sslclient",
	   "sslserver", "nssslserver", "smimesign", "smimeencrypt",  "crlsign",
	   "ocsphelper",   "timestampsign",  "codesign"	 and  "any".   If  peer
	   certificate	verification   is   enabled,   by   default   the   TLS
	   implementation   and	  thus	the  commands  openssl-s_client(1)  and
	   openssl-s_server(1)	check	for   consistency   with   TLS	 server
	   ("sslserver")  or  TLS  client  use ("sslclient"), respectively.  By
	   default,  CMS  signature  validation,  which	  can	be   done   via
	   openssl-cms(1),  checks  for	 consistency  with  S/MIME  signing use
	   ("smimesign").

	   While IETF RFC 5280 says that id-kp-serverAuth and  id-kp-clientAuth
	   are only for WWW use, in practice they are used for all kinds of TLS
	   clients and servers, and this is what OpenSSL assumes as well.

       -verify_depth num
	   Limit  the certificate chain to num intermediate CA certificates.  A
	   maximal depth chain can have up to num+2 certificates, since neither
	   the end-entity certificate nor the  trust-anchor  certificate  count
	   against the -verify_depth limit.

       -verify_email email
	   Verify  if  email  matches  the email address in Subject Alternative
	   Name or the email in the subject Distinguished Name.

       -verify_hostname hostname
	   Verify if hostname matches DNS name in Subject Alternative  Name  or
	   Common Name in the subject certificate.

       -verify_ip ip
	   Verify  if  ip matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
	   the subject certificate.

       -verify_name name
	   Use a set of verification parameters,  also	known  as  verification
	   method,  identified	by  name.  The currently predefined methods are
	   named "ssl_client", "ssl_server", "smime_sign" with	alias  "pkcs7",
	   "code_sign", and "default".	These mimic the combinations of purpose
	   and trust settings used in SSL/(D)TLS, CMS/PKCS7 (including S/MIME),
	   and code signing.

	   The	verification  parameters include the trust model, various flags
	   that can partly be set also via other command-line options, and  the
	   verification	 purpose,  which  in turn implies certificate key usage
	   and extended key usage requirements.

	   The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs  are
	   applicable  to  verifying  the given certificate chain.  They can be
	   given   using   the	 -addtrust   and   -addreject	 options    for
	   openssl-x509(1).

   Extended Verification Options
       Sometimes  there	 may  be  more than one certificate chain leading to an
       end-entity  certificate.	  This	usually	 happens   when	  a   root   or
       intermediate   CA  signs	 a  certificate	 for  another  a  CA  in  other
       organization.  Another reason is when a CA might have intermediates that
       use two different signature formats, such  as  a	 SHA-1	and  a	SHA-256
       digest.

       The  following  options	can be used to provide data that will allow the
       OpenSSL command to generate an alternative chain.

       -xkey infile, -xcert infile, -xchain
	   Specify an extra certificate, private  key  and  certificate	 chain.
	   These  behave  in the same manner as the -cert, -key and -cert_chain
	   options.  When specified, the callback  returning  the  first  valid
	   chain will be in use by the client.

       -xchain_build
	   Specify  whether  the application should build the certificate chain
	   to be provided to the server for  the  extra	 certificates  via  the
	   -xkey, -xcert, and -xchain options.

       -xcertform DER|PEM|P12
	   The	input  format  for  the	 extra certificate.  This option has no
	   effect and is retained for backward compatibility only.

       -xkeyform DER|PEM|P12
	   The input format for the extra key.	This option has no  effect  and
	   is retained for backward compatibility only.

   Certificate Extensions
       Options	like  -purpose	and  -verify_name  trigger  the	 processing  of
       specific certificate extensions, which determine what  certificates  can
       be used for.

       Basic Constraints

       The  basicConstraints extension CA flag is used to determine whether the
       certificate can be used as a CA. If the CA flag is true then it is a CA,
       if the CA flag is false then it is not a CA. All CAs should have the  CA
       flag set to true.

       If  the	basicConstraints  extension  is absent, which includes the case
       that it is an X.509v1 certificate, then the certificate is considered to
       be a "possible CA" and other extensions are  checked  according	to  the
       intended	 use of the certificate.  The treatment of certificates without
       basicConstraints as a CA is presently supported, but this  could	 change
       in the future.

       Key Usage

       If the keyUsage extension is present then additional restraints are made
       on  the	uses  of  the  certificate.  A	CA  certificate	 must  have the
       keyCertSign bit set if the keyUsage extension is present.

       Extended Key Usage

       The  extKeyUsage	 (EKU)	extension  places  additional  restrictions  on
       certificate  use. If this extension is present (whether critical or not)
       in an end-entity certificate, the key  is  allowed  only	 for  the  uses
       specified,  while  the  special	EKU  anyExtendedKeyUsage allows for all
       uses.

       Note that according to RFC 5280 section 4.2.1.12, the Extended Key Usage
       extension will appear only in end-entity certificates, and  consequently
       the  standard  certification  path validation described in its section 6
       does not include EKU checks for CA certificates.	 The  CA/Browser  Forum
       requires	 for  TLS  server, S/MIME, and code signing use the presence of
       respective EKUs in subordinate CA certificates (while excluding them for
       root CA certificates), while taking over from RFC 5280  the  certificate
       validity concept and certificate path validation.

       For  historic  reasons,	OpenSSL	 has  its  own	way of interpreting and
       checking EKU extensions on CA certificates,  which  may	change	in  the
       future.	 It  does  not	require	 the  presence	of EKU extensions in CA
       certificates, but in  case  the	verification  purpose  is  "sslclient",
       "nssslserver",  "sslserver",  "smimesign",  or "smimeencrypt", it checks
       that   any   present   EKU   extension	(that	 does	 not	contain
       anyExtendedKeyUsage)  contains  the  respective	EKU  as detailed below.
       Moreover, it does these checks even for trust anchor certificates.

       Checks Implied by Specific Predefined Policies

       A specific description of each check is given below. The comments  about
       basicConstraints	 and  keyUsage	and X.509v1 certificates above apply to
       all CA certificates.

       (D)TLS Client ("sslclient")
	   Any given extended key usage extension must allow  for  "clientAuth"
	   ("TLS WWW client authentication").

	   For	 target	  certificates,	  the	key   usage   must   allow  for
	   "digitalSignature" and/or "keyAgreement".  The Netscape  certificate
	   type must be absent or have the SSL client bit set.

	   For	all other certificates the normal CA checks apply. In addition,
	   the Netscape certificate type must be absent or have the SSL CA  bit
	   set.	 This is used as a workaround if the basicConstraints extension
	   is absent.

       (D)TLS Server ("sslserver")
	   Any	given  extended key usage extension must allow for "serverAuth"
	   ("TLS WWW server authentication") and/or  include  one  of  the  SGC
	   OIDs.

	   For	 target	  certificates,	  the	key   usage   must   allow  for
	   "digitalSignature", "keyEncipherment", and/or  "keyAgreement".   The
	   Netscape  certificate type must be absent or have the SSL server bit
	   set.

	   For all other certificates the normal CA checks apply. In  addition,
	   the	Netscape certificate type must be absent or have the SSL CA bit
	   set.	 This is used as a workaround if the basicConstraints extension
	   is absent.

       Netscape SSL Server ("nssslserver")
	   In addition to what has been described for sslserver, for a Netscape
	   SSL client to connect to an SSL server, its EE certificate must have
	   the keyEncipherment bit set if the keyUsage	extension  is  present.
	   This	 isn't	always valid because some cipher suites use the key for
	   digital signing.  Otherwise it is the same as a normal SSL server.

       Common S/MIME Checks
	   Any	given	extended   key	 usage	 extension   must   allow   for
	   "emailProtection".

	   For	target	certificates,  the  Netscape  certificate  type must be
	   absent or should have the S/MIME bit set.  If the S/MIME bit is  not
	   set	in  the	 Netscape  certificate	type then the SSL client bit is
	   tolerated as an alternative but a warning is shown.	This is because
	   some Verisign certificates don't set the S/MIME bit.

	   For all other certificates the normal CA checks apply. In  addition,
	   the	Netscape  certificate type must be absent or have the S/MIME CA
	   bit set.  This is used  as  a  workaround  if  the  basicConstraints
	   extension is absent.

       S/MIME Signing ("smimesign")
	   In addition to the common S/MIME checks, for target certificates the
	   key usage must allow for "digitalSignature" and/or nonRepudiation.

       S/MIME Encryption ("smimeencrypt")
	   In addition to the common S/MIME checks, for target certificates the
	   key usage must allow for "keyEncipherment".

       CRL Signing ("crlsign")
	   For target certificates, the key usage must allow for "cRLSign".

	   For	all  other  certificates the normal CA checks apply.  Except in
	   this case the basicConstraints extension must be present.

       OCSP Helper ("ocsphelper")
	   For target certificates, no checks are performed at this stage,  but
	   special checks apply; see OCSP_basic_verify(3).

	   For all other certificates the normal CA checks apply.

       Timestamp Signing ("timestampsign")
	   For	target	certificates, if the key usage extension is present, it
	   must include "digitalSignature" and/or "nonRepudiation" and must not
	   include other bits.	The EKU extension must be present  and	contain
	   "timeStamping" only.	 Moreover, it must be marked as critical.

	   For all other certificates the normal CA checks apply.

       Code Signing ("codesign")
	   For target certificates, the key usage extension must be present and
	   marked critical and include <digitalSignature>, but must not include
	   "keyCertSign"  nor "cRLSign".  The EKU extension must be present and
	   contain "codeSign", but must not include  "anyExtendedKeyUsage"  nor
	   "serverAuth".

	   For all other certificates the normal CA checks apply.

BUGS
       The  issuer  checks  still  suffer  from	 limitations  in the underlying
       X509_LOOKUP API.	 One consequence of this is that  trusted  certificates
       with  matching  subject	name must appear in a file (as specified by the
       -CAfile option), a directory (as specified by -CApath), or a  store  (as
       specified by -CAstore).	If there are multiple such matches, possibly in
       multiple	 locations,  only  the	first  one  (in	 the mentioned order of
       locations) is recognised.

SEE ALSO
       X509_verify_cert(3),	 OCSP_basic_verify(3),	     openssl-verify(1),
       openssl-ocsp(1),		  openssl-ts(1),	   openssl-s_client(1),
       openssl-s_server(1), openssl-smime(1), openssl-cmp(1), openssl-cms(1)

HISTORY
       The checks enabled by -x509_strict have been extended in OpenSSL 3.0.

COPYRIGHT
       Copyright 2000-2026 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.

       Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not  use
       this  file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
       in   the	  file	 LICENSE   in	the   source   distribution    or    at
       <https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.

3.5.7				   2026-06-09OPENSSL-VERIFICATION-OPTIONS(1SSL)